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A fundamental problem in security is authentication: namely, how to verify
the identity of another party. Without this verification, the ideas of privacy and
integrity are moot. Modern authentication techniques use cryptographic oper-
ations that secure the system against adversaries that do not have tremendous
amounts of computation and memory. However, when the abilities of the adver-
sary increase, such authentication paradigms become more susceptible to defeat.
With the greater threat of defeat, the secret authentication keys must be replaced
more often. Unfortunately, the popular key replacement algorithms typically rely
on either third parties or on non-trivial computational ability. In this thesis we
attack these two aspects of the authentication problem by presenting novel meth-
ods for authentication and key replacement in wireless environments.
We describe how to exploit the randomness of the physical layer to hide the
authentication from adversaries. Typically, no effort is made to hide the authen-
tication - it is sent in plain view of friend and foe alike. The proposed technique
reveals significantly less key information than traditional authentication meth-
ods and can increase the data throughput of the system. We define metrics to
quantify the performance of the proposed authentication system and use them to
study the associated tradeoffs. A software radio implementation is then presented
to demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed scheme.
Finally, we consider how secret keys can be replaced in an efficient manner.
We describe a novel method of key replacement and generation that, unlike other
methods, requires no additional message exhanges after initialization and yet
generates highly random keys. As an added benefit, the method is shown to be
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The first step towards secure communication is authentication. Unless you know
and trust the person you are talking with, it is clearly unwise to share secrets
with her, no matter how secure the channel is from malicious parties. Without
authentication, the ideas of privacy and integrity are moot.
In this thesis we consider authentication between two nodes, say Alice and
Bob, who share a secret. This is the assumption used by message authentication
codes (MACs), where the secret is used to generate the MAC from the message.
Alice and Bob want to authenticate in the presence of an active adversary, Eve,
who tries to remove, spoof, impersonate, or otherwise disrupt the authentication.
A fundamental weakness in MACs lies in the secrecy of the key: repeated use of
the same key reveals key information to Eve, who then can use it to disrupt the
authentication. Unfortunately, this leakage of key information is unavoidable in
authentication [1].
Modern authentication techniques use cryptographic operations (e.g., block
ciphers, digital signatures, keyed hashes) that deter the adversary from defeating
the system since doing so would require tremendous amounts of computation and
1
memory. However, when the abilities of the adversary increase, such authentica-
tion paradigms become more susceptible to defeat and therefore the keys must
be replaced more often.
In this thesis we attack this problem by presenting novel methods for authen-
tication and key replacement.
• We describe how to exploit the randomness of the physical layer to hide
the authentication from adversaries. Using this technique reveals signif-
icantly less key information than traditional authentication methods and
can increase the data throughput of the system.
• We describe a novel method of key replacement and generation that, unlike
other methods, requires no additional message exhanges after initialization
and yet generates highly random keys. As an added benefit, the method
is shown to be extremely lightweight in terms of computation and memory
requirements.
Before going into further detail, we consider the following motivating exam-
ples.
1.2 Motivating Examples
1.2.1 Cryptography is Vulnerable to Advances in Adver-
sary Ability
Most authentication methods in use today rely on cryptography, whose secu-
rity depends on the infeasibility of attacks. For example, many cryptographic
algorithms rely on the hardness1 of computing discrete roots, or more recently
1In cryptography, the hardness of a problem refers to the complexity of solving it.
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elliptic curve discrete logarithms (e.g., RSA and Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman[2],
respectively). Though no efficient method is known for these problems on cur-
rently available hardware (existing methods are super-polynomial in the number
of digits of the ciphertext), there are methods that can solve some problems
in polynomial time on quantum computers [3], which fortunately are currently
unavailable.
Historically, it has become easier to break cryptographic schemes as computers
become more powerful2 and less costly and as the attack algorithms become more
efficient. RSA Laboratories has sponsored challenges to crack commonly used
ciphers such as RC5 and DES to give security researchers understanding about
the abilities of real-world attackers. As expected, short keys can be recovered in
a short3 time, while the recovery of larger keys can take exponentially longer4
time.
However, as we noted before, the strength of the schemes are not guaranteed
in the event of algorithmic or computational breakthroughs. We give a few exam-
ples of attacks against hash functions. In August 1998, a significant attack was
made against SHA-0 which significantly decreased the computations required to
defeat it [5]. In 2004 and 2005, more weaknesses were found in SHA-1, MD5,
RIPEMD [6][7]. Most recently, in 2008, Adi Shamir (the S in RSA) introduced a
new cryptanalytic technique termed the ”cube attack” that exposes new vulner-
2Though Moore’s law predicts the doubling of transistor density every 2 years, this does not
translate into a doubling of performance. In fact, a ∼ 45% increase in transistors translates
into only a ∼ 10-20% increase in performance [4].
3In 1999 DES, which uses a 56-bit key, was cracked in 22 hours, 15 minutes
(http://www.distributed.net/des/release-desiii.txt)
4In 2002 RC5-64, which uses 64-bit symmetric key, was cracked in 1757 days
(http://www.distributed.net/pressroom/news-20020926.txt)
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abilities in a variety of block ciphers, stream siphers, and hash functions [8]. The
typical response upon learning of these attacks is to either create new algorithms,
use longer keys, or a combination of the two. However, these usually result in
increased complexity for all parties involved.
We therefore wish to move towards methods whose strength does not rely
solely upon the ability of the adversary. That is, in addition to cryptographic
security we will also consider information-theoretic security by removing the com-
putational constraints of the adversary.
1.2.2 Key Replacement is Not Cheap
Current paradigms of key replacement are expensive in different ways. We briefly
outline two common methods.
1) Public key methods: The canonical key agreement example is the Diffie-
Helman (DH) protocol [2] in which Alice and Bob establish a secret key over
an insecure channel. The protocol requires the exchange of 2 messages over
the channel and some non-trivial computation (modular exponentiation) but the
main weakness is its susceptibility to man-in-the-middle attacks: an adversary
can act as an undetected intermediary between Alice and Bob and has full read
and write access to all the messages shared between them. Thus DH also requires
authentication methods, such as encrypted key exchange (EKE [9]), that increases
the computational burden of Alice and Bob. Public key methods use asymmetric
cryptography which are in general hundreds or even thousands of times slower
than symmetric cryptography.
2) Infrastructure methods: Perhaps the simplest way for Alice and Bob to
replace their keys is to ask someone else (an authority, such as Verisign5 c©) to do
5As an example of delegation of responsibility, Verisign’s motto is: ”When your customers
4
it for them. However, this only shifts the computational burden from the client to
the server. The man-in-the-middle problem is circumvented by having the clients
authenticate themselves to the trusted authority, possibly through the use of
digitally signed certificates. However, this class of methods requires the presence
of a third-party authority which may not always be available. In addition, the
key authority becomes a single point of failure, which may not necessarily be a
bad thing6.
Thus we see that the two main methods of key replacement require a com-
bination of non-trivial computation, communications over the insecure channel,
and the assistance of third parties. In this thesis we will explore how these re-
quirements can be removed while retaining the ability to generate shared keys
that appear highly random to the adversary.
1.3 Approach
1.3.1 Authentication Method
We outline our method for authentication at the physical layer. We then list the
assumptions that we make.
trust you, trust Verisign”.
6”We have in effect put all our rotten eggs in one basket, and we intend to watch this basket
carefully” - from the motion picture The Great Escape. The UNIX operating system takes




We concentrate our efforts at the physical layer of wireless systems. It is the first
line of defense against the randomness of the environment (e.g., random noise,
attenuation, and interference) and a variety of techniques are used to provide an
error-free channel to the higher layers. Well-engineered systems are designed with
a tolerance to handle faults that can occur during normal operating conditions.
Such systems are built to fail, or be in outage, for only a small fraction of the
time.
Typically, authentication is transmitted along with messages so that the re-
ceiver can verify both the integrity and authenticity of the messages. The au-
thentication signal is generated from the message and a secret key shared by
transmitter and receiver. Using the cryptographic terminology, we refer to the
authentication signals as tags.
In order to have good security properties, the tag is constructed to appear ran-
dom to all but the intended receiver - this protects the message from undetected
forgery or tampering by making it difficult for the adversaries to construct valid
message-authentication pairs. Typically, this ”randomness” is achieved through
cryptographic means such as encryption or keyed hashes.
Our idea for authentication is to utilize the randomness of the channel to help
hide the authentication. To do this, we superimpose the authentication signal
and the data waveforms. This is in contrast to time-multiplexing, which is the
traditional route of cryptographic solutions. Because we are superimposing the
tag on the message, unlike traditional MACs we extend the tag generation to allow
null symbols. In our superimposed signal framework, this allows some portions
of the data signal to be unaffected by the authentication, i.e, no superposition in
some parts of the data.
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In order to be useful, the authentication should have the following properties:
• have little impact on the data outage probability
• allow the receiver to reliably verify the transmitter’s identity
• be difficult for any adversary to spoof or forge
Our method has the added benefit of having very low complexity.
Assumptions
We make the following assumptions:
• Alice and Bob communicate using discrete packets of data
• The channel is possibly convolutive, with additive noise at the receiver
• Alice and Bob share a key unknown to anyone else
• Eve can overhear Alice and Bob’s messages and transmit arbitrary messages
to them
1.3.2 Key Replacement
We outline our new method for key replacement. We then list the assumptions
that we make.
Method
Our idea for key replacement is use key replacement models to restrict the possi-
bilities for the next key given the current key. Without knowledge of the model,
however, the key replacements appear to be completely random to the adversary.
For each key, the models dictate possible sets of replacement keys. That is, for a
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given key, model a may specify that the next key is either 1 or 2 while model b
specifies that it is either 3 or 4.
Suppose that Alice and Bob agree upon the replacement model and the current
key. Suppose further that Alice and Bob agree to change keys at certain times.
To replace the key, Alice simply selects a key from the current replacement set.
Since Bob knows the possibilities for the next key, Bob can test each key in the
replacement set and acquire the key. Note that as long as the replacement sets
are small, Bob’s exhaustive search is feasible.
In order to be useful, the key replacement method should have the following
properties:
• have reasonable storage and computational requirements
• allow the receiver to reliably acquire the correct key without significant
expenditure of computation or energy
• keep the current key secret from any adversary
• keep the key replacement model secret from any adversary
Our key replacement method has the added benefit of not requiring any com-
munication between transmitter and receiver, aside from initialization. While
most traditional key replacement strategies require key negotiation messages to
be passed, our method simply has the transmitter change the key and the receiver
detect it.
Assumptions
Our key replacement method makes the following assumptions:
• Initially, Alice and Bob share secrets: the secret key and which replacement
model will be used
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• Eve is able to observe the communications between Alice and Bob
1.4 Contributions and Roadmap of This Thesis
In Chapter 2 we cover the background and foundation that will be utilized in
later chapters. We first introduce the insecure channel scenario and define the
roles of each party. In that context, we then cover the fundamental ideas of
authentication and communications over wireless channels. Finally, we define
the metrics that we will use to evaluate the authentication method.
In Chapter 3 we introduce the physical layer authentication method over a
single carrier by detailing the signal processing at the transmitter and receiver.
We also describe the possible adversary strategies and discuss their effectiveness.
We find that authentication can be reliably achieved at the physical layer while
remaining hidden from adversaries. By exploiting the uncertainties of the channel
to disguise the signal, we are able to keep the amount of leaked key information
low. While the reliability of the authentication is particularly good in the high
SNR regimes, we find that there is a tradeoff between stealth and security. We
then extend the techniques to fast-fading channels and show that though the
performance is decreased, authentication is still possible in such environments.
In Chapter 4 we extend the single carrier framework to the multiple carrier
setting, and find that the richness of this scenario allows us to design the authen-
tication in a very flexible manner. When multiple carriers are available for the
authentication, we find that spreading the tags over many carriers increases the
reliability of the authentication. At the same time, leaving some portions of the
signal untagged forces Eve to estimate where the authentication is hidden - this
further hinders her ability to collect information about the secret key. With some
channel state information, the transmitter is able to allocate power between the
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carriers as well as between the message and the tag. We find that the power al-
location plays a major role in the performance of the authentication and analyze
some simple strategies that yield drastically different results.
In Chapter 5 we describe our implementation of the authentication technique
in a testbed of software-defined radios. After an introduction to our hardware
setup, we detail the design of the transmitter and receiver as well as the experi-
mental procedure. Finally, we demonstrate the performance of the technique and
demonstrate satisfactory real-world performance.
In Chapter 6 we introduce the key replacement method that is based on
Markov models. We give techniques that allow extremely large key spaces while
having little storage and computational requirements. Further, we show that
without knowledge of the replacement model, the adversary is unable to obtain
significant information about future keys or the replacement model. Thus, the
method is shown to have good security properties and be feasible for implementa-
tion. We conclude by giving examples of how this key replacement method may





In this chapter we lay the groundwork for the physical layer authentication
method. We cover the following:
• We first describe the primary participants in the authentication and the
assumptions that we make about them.
• We give an introduction to the authentication problem as well as a survey
of the relevant literature.
• We give an introduction to wireless channels which motivates us to consider
a method that takes advantage of the randomness for authentication.
• We introduce the relevant metrics which we will use in the following chapters
for judging the performance of the new method
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2.2 Cast of Characters
2.2.1 Scenario
We consider the scenario depicted in Figure 2.1 where four nodes share a wireless
medium. We first describe the system where our authentication method is not
used. Alice sends data messages to Bob using untagged signals while Carol
and Eve listen. This network has no privacy, so Carol and Eve can understand
what Alice is sending to Bob.
Now suppose that Alice and Bob use a physical layer authentication scheme
(introduced in Chapter 3) that allows Bob to verify that the messages he receives
are from Alice. In order to authenticate, Alice sends a proof of authentication,
call it a tag1, simultaneously with each message for Bob’s verification. The tag
reflect knowledge of a key shared between Alice and Bob, and is used by Bob to
verify message integrity and authenticity. We call the transmitted signal under
this scheme the tagged signal.
Alice and Bob are the main participants of the authentication scheme. Carol
and Eve are bystanders. Carol does not know the scheme and does not authenti-
cate Alice’s messages, while Eve knows the scheme but does not have the secret
key. We say that Bob and Eve are aware receivers and Carol is an unaware
receiver.
Authentication is a security mechanism and we must therefore consider the
possible attacks on it. In the following we assume that Eve wishes to disrupt
the authentication process by causing Bob to either reject authentic messages or
accept inauthentic messages.














Figure 2.1: Scenario with Alice, Bob, Carol, and Eve.
2.2.2 Channel Assumptions
We assume that Bob, Carol, and Eve have the same type of channel (e.g., block
fading), but we do not place any restrictions on the statistics. For example, Eve
may have a higher average SNR than Bob.
Eve is an adversarial aware receiver who does not know the secret key. She
is an active opponent and can transmit her own signals that are observable by
Bob (Figure 2.1). However, it is impossible for Eve to coherently disrupt Alice’s
message blocks (i.e., flip specific bits while leaving others untouched). This is a
fundamental restriction at the physical layer of a mobile wireless system (Sec-
tion 2.4), because any error in estimating the propagation delay, multipath, and
mobility between Alice, Bob, and herself will result in a non-coherent interrup-
tion. Though Eve may try to modify specific symbols in a frame by overpowering
Alice’s signal with her malicious signal, she can only corrupt the signal incoher-




2.3.1 Factors of Authentication
Authentication is the process of verifying identity. As humans, we are able to
verify the identity of our friends through a variety of ways including sight and
sound. When sight and sound are not available, say during text messaging, we
may verify identity by obtaining satisfactory answers to a series of questions. A
common question is simply ‘What is the password’.
Modern devices often authenticate in such a manner that ignores physical
device characteristics such as the pulse shape, oscillator drift, etc. This is like a
members-only club that requires a secret password for entry. In the absence of
other safeguards, anyone who obtains the password would be granted entry into
the club. Such a simple authentication scheme is totally reliant on how well the
secret is kept.
Realistically, a club would not let in a stranger just because he knows the
password of the day. He would be subject to additional scrutiny. A membership
card may be required. His voice may be verified. His fingerprints may be scanned.
In general, the factors for authentication can be divided into four categories:
• what the user knows
• what the user has
• what the user does
• what the user is
According to the U.S. Government’s National Information Assurance Glos-
sary, strong authentication is the layered authentication approach relying on
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two or more authenticators to establish the identity of an originator or receiver
of information. Concisely, strong authentication requires multiple factors.
2.3.2 Common Implementations
We review examples of how the factors of authentication are commonly imple-
mented. ‘What you know’ is proved with passwords or encryption with secret
keys. ‘What you have’ is proved with smart cards, tokens, and dongles. ‘What
you do’ is proved with voice recognition, gait recognition, and keystroke dynam-
ics. ‘What you are’ is proved with fingerprint recognition, retinal scans and DNA
samples.
The paradigms of ‘what you do’ and ‘what you are’ exist primarily for user-
to-machine authentication; the mechanisms for verifying these paradigms for
machine-to-machine authentication are not sufficiently explored. By introduc-
ing this technique at the physical layer, the way is paved for strong, multilayer
authentication.
In this thesis we consider message authentication codes (MACs, or commonly
tags), which are used to simultaneously verify message integrity and authenticity.
Suppose that Alice wishes to transmit a message S to Bob, and that they both
share a secret key k. The tag associated with the message is
T = g(S, k) (2.1)
where g(·) is the tag generation function whose structure depends on the type of
MAC2. Alice then transmits both S and T to Bob. Since Bob also has the secret
2There are many flavors of MAC that are based on different implementations: keyed-hashes
(HMAC), universal hashing (UMAC), and block-ciphers (CMAC) are a few prominent exam-
ples.
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key, he is able to regenerate the tag after receiving S. He then compares his
regenerated tag with T and accepts the message as untampered and from Bob if
they match exactly. Otherwise, he rejects the message. We discuss the security
of such schemes in light of the possible attacks.
2.3.3 Attacks
To defeat authentication schemes that use MACs, Eve must be able to cause Bob
to
1. reject authentic messages, or
2. accept inauthentic messages
with non-negligible probability.
The following are common attacks to this type of authentication system.
Jamming Attacks
Eve can try to distort the message or tag so that they will not be verified by Bob.
She can do this by transmitting a jamming signal while Alice is transmitting to
Bob. This situation may be viewed as a degradation in SNR and hence may be
combatted through increased error coding or conventional physical layer meth-
ods of co-channel interference rejection. However, this attack not only destroys
the authentication, but the message as well. Since authentication is only useful
when the message is received correctly, the system functions as expected and the




In an effort to have Bob accept erroneous messages that do not originate from
Alice, Eve can simply replay messages and tags that Alice had transmitted in the
past. This is the replay attack. Eve may want to do this when Alice instructs Bob
to do something favorable, e.g., ‘Pay Eve 100 dollars’. This can be combatted
by assuming that Alice never transmits the same frame twice. For example, each
frame may contain a timestamp or nonce3.
Substitution Attacks
Rather than simply replaying captured message and tag pairs, Eve may send her
own message block with a captured tag to Bob. The success of this attack depends
on the preimage resistance of the function g(·). The function g(·) is preimage
resistant when given T , it is hard to find S̃ 6= S such that g(S̃, k) = g(S, k) = T .
Since Eve does not have the key, she is unable to verify that the captured tag
will match with the tag that Bob will generate given the substituted message.
Hence when g(·) is preimage resistant, the substitution attack is successful with
very low probability.
Impersonation Attacks
Eve may be even more aggressive and replace not only the message, but generates
her own messages and tags and sends them to Bob. In this way, she attempts to
impersonate Alice. Without the secret key, the probability that Eve’s message
will be authenticated depends on Bob authentication test and its power.
However, when Eve gains information about the key, she is able to do better.
3A nonce is a number that is used only once. They are often random or pseudo-random
numbers that are used to randomize otherwise identical input.
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Note that in the worst case, Eve knows the entire key and can transmit arbitrary
messages to Bob which he will accept. At this point, the system is compromised
and Alice and Bob must replace the key. It is therefore of the utmost importance
to keep the key secret from Eve.
2.3.4 Properties of the Authentication Tag
The authentication tag provides a unique identifier associated with the message
that only the intended receiver can verify. To all others, the tag appears to be
random so that it is difficult to predict and hence difficult to forge or spoof.
Equation (2.1) states the relationship between message, key, and tag. As Sec-
tion 2.3.3 reveals, the tag generation function g(·) must satisfy special properties
in order for the authentication to be resistant to attack. To summarize, the tag
must satisfy the following:
• Preimage resistant: given a tag it is computationally infeasible to find an-
other message that yields the same tag
• Second preimage resistant: given a message x, it is computationally infea-
sible to find another message y such that g(x, k) = g(y, k).
• Collision resistant: it is computationally infeasible to find two distinct mes-
sages x 6= y such that g(x, k) = g(y, k).




In a single-antenna system, the transmitted signals pass through a convolutive




h(t, τ)x(t− τ)dτ + η(t) (2.2)
where x(·) is the transmitted signal, h(t, ·) is the channel response at time t, τ is
the delay parameter for the multipath components, and η(·) is the additive noise.
The channel is described by a time-variant impulse response
h(t, τ) = α(t, τ)e−jθ(t,τ) (2.3)
where α(t, τ) is the gain and θ(t, τ) is the phase shift of the channel. When there
are many scatterers and paths, the Central Limit Theorem is often applied to ap-
proximate the sum contribution of all paths as a Gaussian variable in α(·). Also,
since small changes perturbs the phase significantly, the phase is commonly mod-
eled by a uniform [0, 2π] random variable. In rich multipath environments h(t, τ)
can be modeled as a zero-mean complex Gaussian process. In this model the gain
has a Rayleigh distributed envelope, and is known as the Rayleigh fading channel.
When a line-of-sight exists, the channel is no longer zero-mean and the envelope
is modeled as a Ricean random variable instead. This model is known as the
Ricean fading channel. The availability of a Rayleigh or Ricean fading is depen-
dent on the richness of the scattering environment, and hence these assumptions
are not always applicable. There are many other models that characterize the
channel by autocorrelation, geometry, or other methods. A widely used model
is the Jakes’ model (also known as Clarke’s model), which describes the situa-
tion when a mobile receiver is surrounded by a uniform (with respect to angle)
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scattering environment. We are concerned primarily with the Rayleigh fading
channel in this thesis.





h(k, i)xk−i + nk (2.4)
This is only one of the many ways to discretize the observation. In general the
continuous signal can be represented by its projection onto basis functions. For
example, we may use the Karhunen-Loeve [10] or various wavelet expansions [11]
to acquire fine information about the signal. Therefore in this thesis we view the
discrete signal to be in general a result of a basis decomposition.
Two important channel parameters are coherence time and coherence band-
width. When two parts of the signal are separated by more than the coherence
time (or bandwidth), they experience independent channels. When the coherence
time is large, the channel is said to be slow-fading and may be assumed constant
over many symbols. Similarly, when the coherence time is small, the channel
is fast-fading and may be assumed constant for only a few symbols. When the
signal bandwidth is smaller than the channel coherence bandwidth, the signal is
narrowband and experiences flat fades, i.e., constant fade across all frequencies.
In this case, the channel at time k is h(k, i) = h(k)δi, since the effect of the
channel is localized in time. If greater, the signal is wideband and experiences
frequency-selective fades so h(k, i) is a vector for each k. For example, an OFDM
signal occupies a bandwidth that experiences frequency selective fades, but each
carrier can be narrow enough so the fading is approximately flat over its band.
The signals are conventionally viewed in blocks of length L: x = {x1, . . . , xL}.
The observation can be written in matrix notation
y = Hx + N (2.5)
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In the case of frequency flat fades, H is a diagonal matrix with elements h(k, i) =







When the channel is time-invariant over the block, h1 = h2 = . . . = hL.








hL1 . . . hLL
 (2.7)
When the channel is time-invariant over the block, H is Toeplitz.
The time variation of a channel may be introduced using simple mechanisms.
The simplest is to assume that the channel is time-invariant over the symbol
block, but each channel realization is different from block to block. At one ex-
treme, the channel may be constant over an infinite number of symbols (slow
fading) or only a single symbol (fast fading). The channel realizations from block
to block depends on the coherence time; they may be modeled as independent
or correlated. A simple class of models are the Finite State Markov Channels
(FSMC) which are typically used to model channel amplitudes. A FSMC model
for Rayleigh Fading introduced by Wang [12] discretizes the SNR γ into regions
such that the SNR stays within a region during a time interval T . For the
next time interval, the SNR can remain in the region or transition to adjacent
regions. The transition probabilities are dependent on the level crossing rates
at the boundaries. One particular case are the autoregressive (AR-n) models,
where the current channel is correlated with the n immediately previous channel
instances.
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In this thesis we consider the independent block fading model for slow-fading
case and the AR-1 channel for the fast-fading case.
2.4.2 Uncertainties
Aside from the actual message content, the receiver experiences uncertainty in
many places. Recall that the received signal is modeled by a convolutive channel
and additive noise (equation (2.2)). Because of imperfect channel estimation and
the additive noise, the receiver cannot be certain of what signal was transmit-
ted. Therefore we propose hiding the authentication by superimposing it on the
message signal, where its presence is obscured by the channel estimate and noise.
We now elaborate on these sources.
Channel Estimation
In order to estimate the channel, the receiver needs to know something about
the transmitted signal and how the channel distorted it. In blind estimation,
the actual transmitted signal is not known but statistics or other characteristics
of it are known. For example, knowing that constant modulus signals are being
transmitted is very helpful for channel estimation [13].
We use pilot symbols to estimate the channel. Pilot symbols are known data
that are used to help the receiver compensate for channel effects. The power,
position, and design of the pilot symbols affect the performance of system through
the quality of the channel estimate and the complexity of the receiver [14].
Traditionally, pilots are placed periodically in the signal and interpolated
to provide a reasonable estimate for the channel. For example, in a slowly-
fading channel, pilots may be placed in the center of a block and the estimated
channel used for symbols before and after the pilots. Optimal TDM schemes that
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maximize mutual information require a substantial overhead and may not even
provide good channel estimates [15]. In the low SNR regime with short coherence
time and hence short block lengths, much of the block is spent estimating the
channel. However, with high SNR and long coherence times, TDM schemes
perform very well.
There are many approaches to channel estimation, the common ones are min-
imum mean square (MMSE) and maximum likelihood (ML). Let the subscript
(·)p denote the vector of pilot symbols. For example, xp are the transmitted pilot
symbols while yp are the corresponding observations through the noisy channel.
A linear channel estimate is a linear function of the observation:
ĥ = Wyp (2.8)
where yp are the observations of the pilot symbols sp. The linear full-rank esti-
mator that minimizes the mean square error is the Wiener filter:
ĥLMMSE = arg min
x
E||x− h||2 (2.9)
For zero mean channels, the solution is well known to be






For a channel with Gaussian statistics, the Kalman filter is a LMMSE in steady
state.
In AWGN, the maximum likelihood estimator is
ĥML = arg min
x
||yp − xpx||2 = (xHp xp)−1xHp yp (2.11)
The ML estimator is the zero-forcing solution in that the error at the pilot symbol
positions is zero. However, one of its weaknesses is that it can significantly
enhance noise over the message symbols.
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Without perfect channel state information (CSI) at the receiver, no channel
estimate can be free from error. The uncertainty of the estimate is usually mea-
sured by mean-squared error and is a function of 1) how well the channel model
fits the real scenario, 2) the strength of the noise and interference (SINR), and
3) the pilot symbols and the estimation scheme.
Noise Models
The most common assumption about the additive noise η(t) is that it is a white
Gaussian process. This process is a purely mathematical construct since it is
characterized by a constant power density of N0/2, and hence infinite power. The
noise power at the receiver is limited by the receiver bandwidth. This additive
white Gaussian noise (AWGN) assumption is commonly used to describe thermal
noise at the receiver or a large aggregate of interferers by invoking the Central
Limit Theorem.
However, the AWGN assumption is inadequate to model impulsive noise. Im-
pulsive noise comes from many sources, both natural (e.g. lightning) and man-
made (e.g. other transmitters, microwave ovens). The basic model of this noise is
as a train of pulses characterized by random amplitude, duration, and interarrival
time as described by the Amplitude Probability Distribution (APD), Pulse Du-
ration Distribution (PDD), and the Pulse Spacing Distribution (PSD). The most
basic way of differentiating between Gaussian and impulsive noise is to classify
noise above a certain threshold as an impulse. The pulse duration is defined as
the time between the positive and subsequent negative crossing. Thus a related
characterization of impulse noise is the Average Crossing Rate (ACR), or the rate
of positive crossings.
Assuming that the impulses are independent and can occur at any time, the
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pulse occurrences are fundamentally Poisson. The pulse duration and amplitude
may either be modeled by random variables or determined empirically. For exam-
ple, the pulse amplitude has been approximated by a power Rayleigh pdf and the
pulse duration by a Gamma pdf. There have been numerous measurements and
techniques [16][17] as well as statistical models and performance analysis [18][19].
Since the noise is inherently random, it is characterized by its probability dis-
tribution. Therefore in order to for the authentication to be hidden by the noise,
it should follow the same distribution; the authentication should be Gaussian
when the additive noise is Gaussian, and impulsive when the noise is impulsive.
This is a simple matter when the noise distribution is known; however, often-
times the distribution is a rough approximation and there is a discrepancy. The
ability of the receiver to discriminate between noise and signal (authentication)
is discussed in Section 2.5.2.
2.4.3 Capacity vs. Rate
We have broken from the traditional TDM placement of authentication tags and
decided to superimpose them instead (see Figure 2.2 for comparison). The ben-
efits of simultaneously transmitting message and tag are manifold.
• Message symbols are constantly transmitted; at no time is message trans-
mission halted to transmit tags. This is typical of non-authenticated com-
munications where messages are queued up and transmitted as soon as
possible.
• Careful superposition of the tag can be transparent to the receivers’ imple-
mentation. That is, the operation of the receiver does not change in the
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Figure 2.2: Time division multiplexed (TDM) versus superimposed (SI) tags
• Capacity that is available but not normally not utilized can be exploited in
higher SNR.
The fundamental limitation on rate is the capacity of the channel. As the SNR
of the channel increases, the capacity increases as well. However, when a fixed
modulation scheme is imposed on the channel, the rate saturates at a finite limit.
Thus as the SNR increases, the unexploited capacity (or capacity headroom)
grows. Our proposed scheme exploits this headroom. To maintain robustness
in fading environments (where SNR changes with time) a modulation scheme is
chosen where the rate is flat within the expected range of SNR variation. By
superimposing additional symbols, the achievable rate is higher when the SNR is
suitably high.
For a simple example refer to Figure 2.3, which shows the rate of BPSK with
equiprobable values ρs ∈ {±1} in an additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN)
channel. The vertical region between the rate and capacity curves is the head-
room. Now when we superimpose an additional independent bit ρt, we use the





t ) = 1 for energy fairness. We see that ρ
2
s percent of the original energy
is used to signal the first bit while ρ2t percent is used to signal the second. As
described before, the rates of this new scheme exceed that of BPSK, and the
improvement grows as the SNR or ρ2t increases.
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Figure 2.3: Rate of superimposed BPSK
2.5 Evaluation Metrics
In this section we consider how we evaluate the new authentication method. The
proposed method works outside traditional paradigms and so requires additional
metrics to measure performance:
• Stealth: the authentication is difficult to detect for everyone but the in-
tended receiver. In particular, it should not significantly impact the per-
formance of the existing system.
• Robustness: the authentication can be reliably detected by the intended
receiver
• Security: the authentication is difficult to forge or spoof. In particular,
the adversary should not be able to gain significant amounts of information
about the secret key.
The metrics will rely on hypothesis testing, so to preface the discussion of




One of the most fundamental tests in hypothesis testing stems from the Neyman-
Pearson lemma, which yields the formulation of threshold tests.
Neyman-Pearson lemma: Let X1, X2, . . . , Xn be drawn i.i.d. according to
a probability mass function Q. Consider the decision problem corresponding to
hypotheses Q = P1 versus Q = P2. For a threshold T ≥ 0, define a region
An(T ) =
{
P1(x1, x2, . . . , xn)





α∗ = P n1 (A
c
n(T )), β
∗ = P n2 (An(T )) (2.13)
be the corresponding probabilities of error corresponding to decision region An.
Here α∗ is the probability of observing a sequence in Acn(T ) (i.e., outside of region
An(T )), when the sequence is drawn from distribution P1. Similarly, β
∗ is the
probability of observing a sequence in An(T ) when the sequence is drawn from
distribution P2. α
∗ is also known as a type I error while β∗ is a type II error. Let
Bn be any other decision region with associated probabilities of error α and β. If
α ≤ α∗ then β ≥ β∗.





where D(f ||g) is the Kullback Leibler distance between probability densities f








The following lemma upper bounds the error exponent in hypothesis testing by
the distance between the distributions of each hypotheses. The basic intuition is
that the further the hypotheses are from each other, the easier it is to distinguish
between them.
Stein’s Lemma: Let X1, X2, . . . , Xn be i.i.d. according to a probability density
function Q. Consider the hypothesis test between two alternatives, Q = P1 and
Q = P2, where D(P1||P2) < ∞. Let An ⊆ X n be an acceptance region for
hypothesis 1. Let the probabilities of error be
α∗ = P n1 (A
c
n(T )), β
∗ = P n2 (An(T )) (2.16)














log βεn = −D(P1||P2) (2.18)
2.5.2 Stealth
We say the authentication scheme is stealthy if it is difficult to detect. There are
actually two aspects to stealth.
1. the presence of the tag should not be easily detectable by adversaries
2. the impact of the tag should not be felt by the unaware receivers
Authentication Presence
The first aspect is measured by the ability of the adversary to detect the authen-
tication. Recall that the adversaries do not have the secret key. Using Stein’s
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lemma, we fix the false alarm probability α and investigate how the missed de-
tection probability β is affected by the authentication.
The receiver decides between the hypotheses
H0 : Observation does not contain any authentication (2.19)
H1 : Observation contains authentication (2.20)
Let Pi be the density of the observations under Hi and let An be the acceptance
region for hypothesis 1 such that the false alarm probability is αn < ε.
Applying Stein’s lemma, by fixing the false alarm probability αn, the missed
detection probability βn decreases with an error exponent D(P0||P1), the KL
distance between the two possible distributions. Thus if the two distributions
have large KL distance, a few observations are sufficient to make a good decision,
while if the distance is small, many observations are necessary. Hence in order
for the tag presence to be stealthy, the probability density of the tagged signal
should be close in KL distance to the untagged signal’s density.
In reality, Eve does not calculate the KL distance in order to determine the
presence of authentication. She can quantify the discrepancy between her ob-
servation and the baseline distribution by using goodness-of-fit tests [20]. These
tests decide whether or not the data follows the given distribution at a signif-














which is simply the greatest discrepancy between the observed and expected cu-
mulative frequencies. The null hypothesis (data does not follow distribution) is
accepted if the statistic exceeds a critical value obtained through table lookup.
Note that the critical values do not depend on the particular distribution be-
ing tested. The outcome of the K-S test is only valid when the distribution is
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fully specified, i.e., the parameters of the distribution cannot be estimated from
the data. When the parameters are not known, the Anderson-Darling test may
be applied, though the critical values are available only for a few distributions.
For an assumption of Gaussian noise, the Lilliefors test may be used when the
expected value and variance are estimated from the samples.
Authentication Impact
Even if the authentication tag is difficult to detect by the adversary, it may not
necessarily be stealthy. To see this, consider the following example. Suppose
that a tag symbol t is added to a BPSK message s and transmitted through an
AWGN channel with SNR γ:
y = s+ t+ w (2.22)
s ∈ {±1} (2.23)
where w is a zero-mean Gaussian random variable with variance σ2w = 1/γ.
Assume that the receiver knows that the noise is Gaussian, but does not know
the power a priori. However, he is able to estimate the noise power from his
observations. If the tag is a zero-mean Gaussian random variable with variance
σ2t , then the estimated noise power σ̂
2
w is zero-mean Gaussian with variance σ
2
t +
σ2w. Thus the unaware receiver treats the tag as noise and is unable to detect its
presence, regardless of its power.
However, as the tag power increases the message throughput drops to zero.
Thus the stealth requirement also restrains the authentication from having a
significant impact on the message recovery. This is dependent on the choice of
modulation and authentication.
The basic metrics for this aspect of stealth are bit error rate and frame out-
age probability. We constrain the impact of the authentication by limiting the
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allowable deviation from the baseline BER and outage probability.
2.5.3 Robustness
We say that the authentication scheme is robust if it can operate in a wide range
of environments. That is, the intended receiver (Bob) should be able to verify
the authentication with a given confidence despite fluctuating channel and noise
conditions.
Suppose that Bob receives the message correctly and wants to authenticate
its source. Phrased as a hypothesis test, Bob needs to determine if the correct
authentication tag is present in his observation or if it contains only random noise
or an incorrect tag. He decides between the hypotheses
H0 : Observation does not contain the correct tag (2.24)
H1 : Observation contains the correct tag (2.25)
Recall that since Bob knows the secret key, he is able to generate the authenti-
cation tag corresponding to the message. Fixing the false alarm probability α,
the missed detection probability β decreases with the error exponent D(P0||P1)
where Pi is the density of the observations under Hi.
Actual implementation of the tag detection depends on the modulation of the
tag, the estimation of the channel, and the estimation of the message. There is
a fundamental tradeoff between stealth and effectiveness: the easier it is for Bob
to determine the tag, the easier it is for Eve to detect its presence. However,
the tradeoff may not always be in favor of Eve. Hence the notion of security is
required and we will discuss it in the following section.
The intended receiver has knowledge of the secret key, and when we have
stealth, the message is recovered with little increase error. In practical systems,
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the error correction codes will mitigate the impact of the authentication on the
data outage. As long as the message is recovered without error, the intended
receiver can generate the correct authentication tag using equation (2.1).
In AWGN, Bob can use a matched filter to form a test statistic for use in a
threshold test (Section 2.5.1). By fixing the false alarm probability α, we take
the power of the test (1-β, i.e., the probability of detecting the authentication
when it is present) as the indication of robustness.
2.5.4 Security
We say that an authentication scheme is secure when Eve cannot defeat the
system. More precisely, Eve should be able to successfully attack the system
(Section 2.3.3) with only a negligible probability.
Recall that authentication is a hypothesis test (equations (2.24) and (2.25)).
In this context, Eve’s attacks are successful if Bob rejects authentic messages
(forcing a type II error) or accepts incorrect messages (forcing a type I error).
We reiterate our problem setup. Alice transmits public messages S ∈ S to
Bob. In order to authenticate the public messages, she also sends authentication
tags S ∈ T , one tag for each message. Each tag is generated with a secret
key k and may depend on the current and prior public messages or tags: Ti =
f(k, S1, . . . , Si, T1, . . . , Ti−1). In the following we assume that the messages and
tags are transmitted through a noiseless channel.
Consider an arbitrary random variable U ∈ U whose distribution is P under
H0 and Q under H1. Suppose that H0 is true. Then the test will decide H0 with
probability 1−α and H1 with probability α. Similarly, when H1 is true, the test
will decide H0 with probability β and H1 with probability 1 − β. The binary
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discrimination between these two distributions is
d(α, β) = α ln
α
1− β
+ (1− α) ln 1− α
β
(2.26)
Theorem [21, Theorem 4.3.3]: Discrimination is increased by a nontrivial
refinement of a set of measurement outcomes.
From this theorem, a well-known result follows: D(P ||Q) ≥ d(α, β) since the
distribution of the hypothesis test outcome may be viewed as a refinement of the
observation probability distribution. The utility of this will soon become clear as
we discuss impersonation and substitution attacks.
First we describe how Alice and Eve’s generate their messages. Alice’s trans-
mission (Ti, K) is generated by the probability distribution
PTi,K|T1=t1,...,Ti−1=ti−1 (2.27)
However, Eve does not have any knowledge of the secret key and so the pair is
generated by a product of marginal distributions
QTi|T1=t1,...,Ti−1=ti−1 · PK|T1=t1,...,Ti−1=ti−1 (2.28)
where Q is the probability distribution that dictates Eve’s attack strategy and P
is the strategy that Alice uses. Note that Eve has access to Alice’s strategy, but
not the secret key. This states that Eve chooses the tag and key based on what
she has seen so far (T1, . . . , TI−1).
Impersonation Attack
Theorem [1, Theorem 3]: For every authentication scheme and for every partic-
ular values of t1, . . . , ti−1, we have
d(α, PI,i(t1, . . . , ti−1)) ≤ I(Ti;K|T1 = t1, . . . , Ti−1 = ti−1) (2.29)
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Moreover,
d(α, PI,i) ≤ I(Ti;K|T1, . . . , Ti−1) (2.30)
In particular, for α = 0 we have
PI,i(t1, . . . , ti−1) ≥ 2−I(Ti;K|T1=t1,...,Ti−1=ti−1) (2.31)
and
PI,i ≥ 2−I(Ti;K|T1,...,Ti−1) (2.32)
One admissible strategy is for Eve to choose her authentication tag based
on QTi|T1=t1,...,Ti−1=ti−1 = PTi|T1=t1,...,Ti−1=ti−1 . Then the above theorem follows
naturally since for random variables X, Y with joint density PXY and marginals
PX , PY , we have D(PXY ||PX · PY ) = I(X;Y ). The theorem gives the result
that the more key information present in the authentication tags, the lower the
probability of a successful impersonation attack. The intuition is that when tags
contain little key information, it is easy for Eve to randomly guess a valid tag.
Substitution Attack
A particular substitution attack attempts to guess the secret key, and thus gain
the ability to forge authentication tags at will. For an arbitrary random variable
U , note that H(U) ≥ − log2(maxu PU(u)) and hence maxu PU(u) ≥ 2−H(U). This
may be interpreted as the probability of guessing a realization of U correctly
given that its probability distribution is known. Similarly, when side information
is given in the form of random variable V , we have maxu PU |V =v ≥ 2−H(U |V =v).
Theorem [1, Theorem 6]: For all t1, . . . , ti we have
PS,i(t1, . . . , ti−1) ≥ 2−H(K|T1=t1,...,Ti−1=ti−1) (2.33)
Moreover,
PS,i ≥ 2−H(K|T1,...,Ti−1) (2.34)
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The theorem gives the result that the higher the uncertainty of the secret key
after a sequence of authentication tags, the lower the probability of a successful
substitution attack.
Key Equivocation
We see that the strength of the authentication is dependent on how well the
secret key is guarded. For if the secret key was known to the adversary, she could
transmit arbitrary messages to Bob that will be accepted as genuine. Therefore
we consider the key equivocation of the Eve: the adversary’s uncertainty about
the key. For example, if Eve has a key equivocation of 64 bits about a 64 bit key,
then she has no information about it, whereas if she has 0 equivocation then she
knows the entire key without any uncertainty.
We consider the key equivocation for two cases: when the tag is known without
error and when it is corrupted.
Known Tag
When the tag is known to the receiver, the key equivocation is
H(K|S, T ) =
∑
s,t
p(S = s, T = t)H(K|S = s, T = t) (2.35)
Expanding the last term with the shortened notation p(k|s, t) = p(K = k|S =
s, T = t), we have









we see that the key equivocation is positive only when p(k|s, t) < 1 for at least
one pair of S, T . That is, multiple keys map the same message to the same tag.
This is guaranteed by the pigeonhole principle when either |K| > |T | or |K| > |S|
(see Figure 2.4). Usually in cryptographic applications the key is much shorter









Figure 2.4: Pigeonhole principle. a) If another key is added, the number of keys
will exceed the number of messages, there will be multiple keys that map at least
1 pair of (message,tag). b) A similar situation arises when the number of keys
exceeds the number of tags.
Let us consider the significance of having zero key equivocation given the
message and tag (i.e., H(K|S, T ) = 0). This allows us to say that given S,
knowing T is equivalent to knowing K and vice versa. Here we assume that the
mapping from S × K → T is deterministic so that H(T |S,K) = 0. That is,
I(K;T |S) = H(K,T |S)−H(K|S, T )
−H(T |S,K) (2.37)
= H(K,T |S) (2.38)
Thus in terms of information theory, knowing the tag is just as good as know-
ing the key. Theoretically therefore, it is very serious for the adversary to know
the tag. In cryptographic applications this is exactly the case since all parties
have noiseless access to everything that is transmitted. However, cryptological
security relies on the infeasibility of computational attack, which may be im-
proved through increasing key length or increasing the complexity of the solving
the underlying cryptographic primitive4.
4Cryptographic primitives can be thought of as a cryptographer’s toolbox; primitives are low-
level, well-established algorithms that are frequently used in security systems. Some examples
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We are interested in what happens as the constraints of the adversary are
removed, and therefore we turn our attention to cases where the tag is not known
exactly.
Estimated Tag
When the tag is estimated by the receiver, it may be recovered with error.
Since Eve estimates each tag symbol with some non-zero error, the size of her
search space increases with the tag symbol equivocation. A straightforward so-
lution is to compute the tags corresponding to each possible key (there are 2K),
then select the key that generates the signal most similar to the residual. This is
the brute force method.
Actually, Eve does not have to check all 2K keys before she finds the correct
key. The birthday paradox5 states that on average, she only has to check on the
order of 2K/2 keys before the she finds the correct key. This assumes that the
tags are uniformly distributed; if not, then the key can becomes more vulnerable
to discovery [22]. However, even with the paradox, with a sufficiently large K
the brute force method is impractical because Eve will run into computation and
memory restraints. The remaining alternative is to attempt inversion of the tag
generating function g(·) from equation (2.1).
When the image of g(·) is observed with sufficient length and without noise,
Eve may be able to recover the key in reasonable time. This would be a real
concern in the higher layers. However, we use g(·) in the physical layer where
there is always some uncertainty about the tag. The adversary has no choice
but to spread its key recovery efforts among the probable tags. For binary tag
include one-way hash functions and various block ciphers.
5The birthday paradox is so-named because of the party trick where in a room with 23
people, the probability where at least two people share a birthday is approximately 1/2, a
surprising result to many people.
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symbols, the number of possible transmitted words doubles as each tag symbol
is estimated. The receiver must prune the possibilities to consider only the more
probable tags, otherwise all possible tags would be considered.
The set of probable tags depends on the tag bit error probability p. When p
is small, the paths that include few errors should be considered more probable,
while the opposite is true when p is large. For example, suppose that the receiver
estimates the binary tag sequence 000. When p is small, the most likely trans-
mitted sequence is 000, and the second most likely sequences are {001, 010, 100}.
The least likely transmitted sequence is 111. If we have a length-L observation








, which is a polynomial factor for fixed k.
Let us suppose that there is zero key equivocation when the tag is known
exactly, i.e., H(K|S, T ) = 0 so that knowing the tag is equivalent to knowing the
secret key. The key equivocation is then equivalently




p(S = s, T̂ = t̂)H(T |S = s, T̂ = t̂) (2.40)
We know that the last term H(T |S = s, T̂ = t̂) depends on p(t|s, t̂) = p(T =
s|S = s, T̂ = t̂) which is







We assume that keys are chosen uniformly so that p(t|s) = 1/K if there exists
a key that maps s to t and 0 otherwise. Note that if no such key exists, then
p(t|s) = 0.
To simplify the discussion, suppose that |S| = |T | = |K| = K and assume that
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p(t̂|s) = p(t̂) = 1/K. That is, the probability of observing any tag is equiprobable
and independent of which message was transmitted. Then we have the following
simplifications
p(S = s, T̂ = t̂) =
∑
s,t̂
p(s)p(t̂|s) = 1/K2 (2.43)
p(t|s, t̂) = p(t̂|t) (2.44)
and therefore the key equivocation (equation (2.40)) becomes









Notice that the key equivocation is thus dependent on the reliability of the tag
observation p(t̂|t). In the best case for security, the observed tags are equiprobable
and the adversary cannot recover any key information; in the worst case the
probability distribution is a delta function and the adversary recovers the key
perfectly.
2.6 Related Work
2.6.1 Cryptographic and Information Theoretic Security
A system is considered cryptographically secure if an adversary cannot defeat the
system given certain constraints on computational ability and time. A system is
considered information-theoretically secure if the system cannot be defeated even
when those constraints are removed. Information theoretic security is obviously
a stronger requirement than cryptographic security.
In order to discuss security we review the concept of perfect secrecy. A message
is passed in perfect secrecy when the adversary has equal a priori and a posteriori
probabilities of knowing the content after observing the ciphertext. That is, the
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observations do not help the adversary make a better estimate of the message. In
our problem, we assume that the messages are public to all while the security lies
in the tags. Thus we are interesting in protecting the secrecy of the tags against
removal, modification, and impersonation.
There are two classical views of a secrecy system: Cryptology generally as-
sumes noiseless observations of message and tags, while Wyner’s wiretap channel
[23] assumes noisy observations. Cryptology attempts to obscure the meaning of
the noiseless observations, while Wyner’s wiretap channel attempts to obscure
the observations of the secret data. We briefly walk through the scenarios and
security results of each paradigm.
Cryptology
In cryptology, messages and tags are transmitted over a perfect channel so that
any receiver, including the adversary, can observe them without error. The se-
curity of a cryptographic system lies in the complexity of inversion without the
secret key. Such systems heavily use one-way functions that are easy to compute
in one direction but difficult (in terms of computation and memory requirements)
to invert. Many are based on mathematical primitives that to date do not have
efficient inversion algorithms such as discrete logarithms and elliptic curves.
Along with the idea of complexity is the issue of search space. By spreading
out the secret keys and tags over a large multidimensional space, the task of
the adversary becomes much harder. If the space is large enough, the adversary
cannot test every possible key given current (and hopefully future) limitations on












Figure 2.5: Wiretap Channel
Wiretap Channel
A generalization [24] of Wyner’s well-known wiretap channel follows. The authen-
tic sender encodes the symbols into the transmitted signal x ∈ RP (where P is the
length of the message) using the stochastic encoder f(x|s, t) : S ×T → RT . The
signal observed by an aware receiver is modeled by instances of the probability
density qY (y|x), while the signal observed by an unaware receiver is an instance
of qZ(z|x). Aware receivers use the deterministic decoder ϕ : RT → S × T while
unaware receivers use ψ : RP → S. See Figure 2.5.
Csiszar [24] showed that when the coding/decoding can be described by a
Markov chain U → V → X → Y Z, the tag can be transmitted in perfect secrecy
when the rates satisfy
0 ≤ Rt ≤ I(V ;Y |U)− I(V ;Z|U) (2.46)
0 ≤ Rs ≤ min[I(U ;Y ), I(U ;Z)] (2.47)
where Rs is the rate of the message transmission and Rt is the rate of the tag.
Note that the rate of the message and tag transmissions are restricted by the
disparities of Bob and Eve’s channels (Note the different probability distributions
for Y and Z).
When the tag is passed in perfect secrecy, Eve cannot gain any knowledge
of the key and hence no attack can succeed above the false alarm probability.
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Csiszar’s result relies on the assumption that Eve has a worse channel than Bob.
2.6.2 Unconditionally Secure Authentication
Wegman and Carter showed how universal hash functions may be used to achieve
unconditionally secure authentication. However, the authentication is uncondi-
tionally secure for only a few messages.
Definition [25]: A class of hash functions H : A → B is strongly universal2 if
for all distinct a1, a2 ∈ A and for all b1, b2 ∈ B, the number of functions h ∈ H
for which both h(a1) = b1 and h(a2) = b2 hold is |H|/|B|2.
It follows that a strongly universal2 class of functions is also universal2.
Definition [25]: A class G of functions g : A → B is universal2 if for any
distinct a1, a2 ∈ A, the probability that g(a1) = g(a2) holds is at most 1/|B|
when g is chosen at random from G according to the uniform distribution.
Now if we use the secret key to select a hash function from a strongly universal2
set of hash functions, we can use it to have unconditionally secure authentication
if we use the hash function to generate the tags. Now an impersonation attack
has success probability pimp = 1/|B| because H is universal2, and hence the
probability that a randomly chosen message will have the correct tag is 1/|B| by
definition.
Similarly, a substitution attack has success probability psub = 1/|B| becauseH
is strongly universal2, and hence it follows from the definition that the probability
that a previously seen message will map to the correct tag is 1/|B|.
We see that with a secret key, unconditionally secure authentication is possi-
ble. However, the above scheme with strongly universal2 classes of hash function
has a major weakness: it may only be used to authenticate 2 messages (the sub-
script 2 is indicative of the 2-message collision properties) with perfect security.
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Allowing the adversary 2 or more (message,tag) pairs will reveal information
about the hash function used, and hence make the attacks more probable.
Now we consider the possibility of authentication when Eve has non-zero
knowledge of the secret key. First we introduce the notion of Renyi entropy,
defined as





It is helpful to note that
∑
s∈S pS(s)
2 is the collision probability of the ran-
dom variable S - the probability that two independent realizations will be the
same. This concept will be particularly useful in the context of attacks on au-
thentication: attacks are succesful when valid and invalid tags coincide. We
can express Renyi entropy and use Jensen’s inequality to note that H2(S) =
− log2E[pS(S)] ≤ −E[log2 ps(S)] = H(S)
Theorem [25]: Let S be a binary string of (even) length n. Assume that S
is used by two parties as the key in the authentication scheme based on strongly
universal hashing with respect to the strongly universal2 class
H = {hab : (a, b) ∈ (GF (2N))2} (2.49)
hab(x) := ax+ b (2.50)
and that an adversary knows a random variable Z jointly distributed with S
according to some probability distribution. The adversary has no further infor-
mation about S. Let
H2(S|Z = z) ≥ (1/2 +R) ∗N (2.51)
for a particular z in the range Z of Z. Then the probabilities of successful
impersonation given Z = z are upper-bounded by
pimp ≤ 2−RN/2 (2.52)
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and
psub ≤ 3 ∗ 2−RN/4 (2.53)
respectively. This gives upper bounds on the attack success when the Renyi
entropy of the key are known.
2.7 Conclusion
We have introduced the scenarios for which we will design our authentication
method. Because of the non-zero capacity headroom, there is leeway to insert
authentication tags at the physical layer that is currently unexploited. We have
also introduced and discussed the three key metrics that will be used to measure




Physical Layer Authentication Framework
3.1 Overview of Contributions
In this chapter we introduce the framework to describe physical layer authentica-
tion systems [26]. We begin with single-carrier systems and analyze the stealth,
robustness, and security of such systems. We identify the authentication power
as a major parameter and we introduce methods of improving the metrics.
We give a preview of the results as follows.
• We introduce a novel authentication system at the physical layer that has
low complexity (Section 3.2).
• The authentication can be spread over multiple messages to improve ro-
bustness (Section 3.2.4).
• The transmission power dedicated to the authentication is a major deter-
mining factor in the performance of the system. Lower-powered authenti-
cation trades robustness for improved stealth and security (Section 3.3).
• Error correcting codes are useful not only for the message reliability but
are also essential for authentication since only error-free messages should
be authenticated (Section 3.3.2).
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• The framework is extended to fast-fading AR-1 channels and demonstrated
to be effective in high SNR regimes (Section 3.4).
3.2 Framework
3.2.1 Signal Model
The sender wants to transmit a message to the receiver so that it can be recovered
and understood. The sender codes and modulates the message to protect against
errors when it is passed through a random channel.
The signal is transmitted in frames of length N f composed of message and au-
thentication symbols. Assume the signals are i.i.d. and thus we drop any time in-
dices. Denote a frame by the column vector x with complex entries {x1, . . . , xNf}.
Let each entry have mean 0 and variance σ2x
E[xm] = 0 (3.1)






= N fσ2x (3.3)
Each frame is formed by superimposing the coded message s and authentica-
tion tag t:
x = ρss + ρtt (3.4)
where ρs, ρt are scaling terms in [0, 1] used to enforce the constraints (3.1) and
(3.2). Assuming that the message and tag are uncorrelated:
E[sHt] = 0 (3.5)
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it follows that
E[sm] = 0, E|sm|2 = σ2x (3.6)
E[tm] = 0, E|tm|2 = σ2x (3.7)
(ρs)2 + (ρt)2 = 1 (3.8)
The message s is generated from the uncoded message block b, and the au-
thentication is generated from b and a shared secret key k ∈ K where |K| = K:
s = fe(b) (3.9)
t = g(b, k) (3.10)
The encoding function fe(·) encapsulates any coding, modulation, or pulse shap-
ing that may be used. The corresponding decoding function fd(·) is used at the
receiver and satisfies
b = fd(fe(b)) (3.11)
for all possible inputs b of fe(·). The tag generating function g(·) is assumed
to be one-way, i.e., it is easy to calculate t given b and k, but hard to find k
given t and b. The usefulness of this property will be discussed in Section 3.3.3.
Further, it is also collision resistant so that it is hard to find x 6= y such that
g(x, k) = g(y, k).
3.2.2 Channel Model and Estimation
We assume a Rayleigh block fading channel so that different message blocks
experience independent fades that are constant for the duration of each block.
While this may not be strictly true, is a reasonable assumption for slow fading
channels.
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Consider a channel realization h which is a complex Gaussian variable with
mean 0 and variance σ2h. The receiver observes the frame
y = hx + w (3.12)
where w = {w1, . . . wNf} and wm ∼ N(0, σ2w) is complex white Gaussian noise.




w. The SNR experienced by each block γ is





When the SNR γ falls below a certain threshold, say γ0, the observed frame be-
comes unacceptably corrupted. The outage probability is the fraction of time that
this occurs. The outage probability Pout can be fixed by setting the transmission









Pilot symbols are typically used to aid in channel estimation, and we insert
them in the middle of the block. (We use this as a representative pilot scheme,
however, we emphasize our framework easily generalizes to other cases). For the








pH (hp + wp) (3.17)
= h+ η (3.18)
where (·)H is the Hermitian transpose and η is a complex Gaussian variable with
zero mean and variance σ2η = σ
2
w/|p|2. We consider the pilot symbols as separate













Figure 3.1: Block diagram of aware receiver.
3.2.3 Message Recovery
A block diagram of the aware receiver is found in Figure 3.1.






It then uses fd(·) to recover the message symbols
b̂ = fd(̂s) (3.20)
For analysis, we assume that the message and tag signals s, t are both mod-
ulated using 4-QAM. The tag constellation is superimposed on each message
symbol to form the constellation shown in Figure 3.2. In the literature this is
called the 4/16 hierarchical QAM constellation. Note that the constellation has
16 symbols; each of these symbols signal the message symbol (which quadrant)
and the tag symbol (which point within the quadrant). Of course, many different
superposition schemes may be considered, and are discussed in Section 3.2.5.
BER Calculation
To calculate the uncoded BER for a hierarchical QAM constellation, we must
know the distance between the symbols as well as the noise power. Let 2d1




Figure 3.2: 4/16 hierarchical QAM constellation. The 16 white circles indicate the
constellation points; the black circles indicate the original 4-QAM constellation
used for the message symbols.
minimum distance between any two tag points within the same quadrant, and 2d′1
be the minimum distance between points in adjacent quadrants (see Figure 3.2).
We first give the exact BER expressions for unit-energy 4/16 constellations and
then apply them to the authentication signals. In general, any number of QAM
constellations may be superimposed on each other. The general expressions for
the BER of general hierarchical QAM constellations are given in [27].





















(Ψ(1, 0) + Ψ(1, 2)) (3.22)
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(2Ψ(0, 1) + Ψ(2, 1) + Ψ(2, 3)) (3.24)
The function Ψ(·) depends on the channel distribution, and for the Rayleigh
channel with unit energy constellations it is [27]
Ψ(a, b) = 1−
√
(ad′1 + bd2)2γ
1 + (ad′1 + bd2)2γ
(3.25)
The noise power N0 is the average noise power for a unit variance channel. For
perfect channel information, it is 1/γ, while for MMSE estimation it is 1/γlmmse >
1/γ.
The effective signal power is σ2hσ
2
x. In order to use Equations (3.21) and (3.23),
the constellation needs to be unit energy. Thus we scale
ρ̃s = ρs/σhσx (3.26)







x = 1/γ (3.28)









d′1 = d1 − d2 ≥ 0 (3.31)
We calculate the BER of the message and tag bits by using these values in
equations (3.21) and (3.23) respectively. Note that equations (3.29)-(3.31) require
that ρs > ρt. Otherwise, the decision boundaries will overlap.
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Outage Probability
As mentioned previously, the message s is a codeword corresponding to the un-
coded message b according to the encoding function fe(·). We are interested in
the ability of Alice to recover b without error.
In fading channels, the importance of minimum Euclidean distance between
codewords is supplanted by the minimum Hamming distance [28]. Suppose that
Alice and Bob use BCH codes to protect the messages. The minimum distance
is lower-bounded by the BCH bound.
Consider the (n, k, t) BCH code. It encodes k message bits into n code bits
and is able to recover from up to t errors. With bit interleaving, the symbol
errors can be assumed independent, and thus the probability that there are at









Thus given the message bit error ps from equation (3.21), the probability that the
BCH code (n, k, t) can recover the message without error is P . The probability
of message error ps is determined by the channel realization h. That is, the BER
requirement may be viewed as a minimum SNR requirement since the BER is
monotonic versus SNR.
Suppose that the system uses the code BCH(n, k, t). Given the SNR γ0, the
message is recovered correctly with probability P . When the SNR falls below γ0
the recovery probability also falls below P and we say that it is an outage. For
the Rayleigh channel, the message outage for a particular SNR requirement γ0 is
given by equation (3.14).
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3.2.4 Tag Detection
In addition to recovering the message, the aware receiver also decides on the au-
thenticity of the signal. If the receiver decides that the observation demonstrates
sufficient knowledge of the key, then it authenticates the sender. Otherwise, the
signal is not authenticated. In this section we introduce the method of authenti-
cation and show that it is low-complexity.
After estimating the channel, the receiver proceeds to perform message esti-
mation and obtains ŝ. With the secret key, it can generate the estimated tag t̂
using equation (3.10) and look for it in the residual r.










The receiver performs a threshold test with hypotheses
H0 : t̂ is not present in y (3.35)
H1 : t̂ is present in y (3.36)







where <(·) takes the real component of its argument.
The decision of authenticity δ is made according to
δ =
 0 τ < τ 01 τ ≥ τ 0 (3.38)
The threshold τ 0 of this test is determined for a false alarm probability α accord-
ing to the distribution of (τ |H0).
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The decision of authenticity can be made after only a few operations: re-
generation of the tag, calculation of the residual, and correlation of the tag and
residual. These are all simple operations (including the tag generation since it is
a one-way function as assumed in Section 3.2.1), and therefore the authentication
is low-complexity.
Determination of τ 0
In order to limit the false alarm probability α, we calculate the threshold τ 0 such
that P (τ > τ 0|H0) ≤ α. There are two main cases where a false alarm can occur:
when the observation contains no tag at all or when the observation contains an
incorrect tag.















(−ηx + w) (3.41)
= x + ŵ (3.42)





w)/|ĥ|2. Thus the residual is Gaussian distributed.
In the following we assume that the message is received without error (b̂ =
b) since only correct messages should be authenticated. When a message is
received with error, it will generate an incorrect tag (addressed in case 2 below)
with high probability due to the collision resistance of g(·) (Section 3.2.1). This
should be interpreted as follows: when a message is received with error, it will be
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authenticated with the false alarm probability α, and when it is received correctly,
it will be authenticated with the detection probability P a.
Case 1: the transmitted signal does not contain any tag (i.e., x = s). Then











<(̂tHs) + v (3.45)
where v is real Gaussian variable with zero mean and variance σ2v = |t|2σ2ŵ/2(ρt)2.
The term <(̂tHs) is a sum of N f i.i.d. variables and is well approximated by
a Gaussian distribution when N f is large (central limit theorem). From equation
(3.5) the mean is zero and the variance σ2ts depends on the symbol constellations.
For example, if the message and tag are QPSK symbols, the variance of <(̂tHs)
is σ2ts = N
f ∗ 1
4
(1 + 1 + 0 + 0) = N
f
2
. Thus the test statistic τ is Gaussian with









Case 2: the transmitted signal contains a tag different from t̂. Then










= <(̂tHt) + v (3.49)
where v is real Gaussian variable with zero mean and variance σ2v = |t|2σ2ŵ/2(ρt)2.
The term <(̂tHt) is a sum of N f i.i.d. variables and is well approximated by
a Gaussian distribution when N f is large (central limit theorem). From equation
(3.5) the mean is zero and the variance σ2tt depends on the tag symbol constella-







Without priors, the threshold is calculated based on the worst case distribu-
tion from either case 1 or 2. Since both are zero mean Gaussian distributions,
the worst case has the largest variance σ̃2τ from equations (3.46) and (3.50).
τ 0 = arg min
τ
Φ(τ/σ̃τ ) ≥ 1− α (3.51)
where Φ(·) is the standard Gaussian cumulative distribution function.
Probability of Authentication
The performance of the authentication is directly tied to the performance of the
message; authentication will occur only when the message is correctly received.
This is logical because distorted messages should not be authenticated.
When Bob generates the correct tag (̂t = t), the test statistic is
τ |H1 = |t|2 + v. (3.52)
The probability of detection is
P a(γ) = 1− Φ((τ 0 − |t|2)/σv). (3.53)
The overall probability of detection is
P a = E[P a] =
∫
P a(γ)p(γ)dγ (3.54)
where p(γ) is the probability density of γ given in equation (3.13).
When the noise is i.i.d., there is no benefit in restricting the number of tagged
symbols since the authentication depends on |t|2 alone. That is, concentrating the
tag power in a few symbols does not increase the detection probability. However,
that strategy may make the tag more noticeable and therefore less stealthy. The
stealth of the tag depends on the characteristics of the noise. For example, if the
noise is impulsive (distribution is heavy-tailed), it is more stealthy to have the
tag also be impulsive (and spread over few symbols). On the other hand, if the
noise is Gaussian, it is more stealthy to have the tag spread over more symbols.
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Outage Probability
The authentication decision is useful when the false alarm probability is very low.
Of nearly equal importance is the probability that valid messages are authenti-
cated. Again, we note that the detection probability is a monotonic function
of SNR, so we map the detection requirement to an SNR requirement. Thus
when we fix the false alarm probability α and require the detection probability
to exceed a given P a, this is equivalent to requiring a minimum SNR γ0. When
the SNR falls below γ0 we say that the authentication is in an outage. For the
Rayleigh channel, the authentication outage for a particular SNR requirement γ0
is given by equation (3.14).
Authentication over Multiple Frames
In the following we consider how the robustness of the authentication may be
improved.
One possible method of improving the detection probability is to raise the
average SNR γ by increasing the transmission power σ2x. This lowers the prob-
ability of unsuitably low SNRs, but is not always feasible due to physical con-
straints. Alternatively, we may extend the authentication process to consider
many frames together instead of each frame separately. Because we are assuming
a Rayleigh block fading channel model, each frame experiences independent fades,
and conditioned on the authenticity of the signal the authentication decisions are
independent events as well.
Suppose that authentication is transmitted over each frame. Let x =
∑K
i=1 δi
to tally the number of detected tags in K blocks. When no tag is sent, the
58
probability of detecting more than k0 tags is




where B(x;n, p) is the binomial probability mass function of getting exactly x
successes in n identical and independent trials with probability of success p. For
the extended test, we compare x with a threshold k0 that is set so that the false
alarm probability does not exceed the new false alarm probability αK





B(i;K,α) < αK ] (3.56)
The Neyman-Pearson test gives the probability of deciding H1 as:
δK =

1 x < k0
π x = k0
0 x > k0
(3.57)
where π is the randomization of the detection rule and is given by
π =
αK − p(x > k0|H0)
p(x = k0|H0)
(3.58)
For a randomly selected group of K tagged signal blocks, the probability of
correctly deciding H1 is simply




where P a is the probability of detection for a randomly observed block (see equa-
tion (3.54)).
There is a fundamental tradeoff between robustness and security. When a
scheme is made more robust in this manner, we are allowing more errors to be
made in the tag detection before rejecting an authentic signal. However, this gives
the adversary more opportunity to inject malicious blocks that may be accepted
as authentic. We will discuss the security issues in Section 3.3.3.
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3.2.5 Superposition Methods
There are many ways to structure the tag for superpositioning - we are not
restricted to the use of heirarchical constellations as considered in the previous
sections. The content of the signal dictates the effect that the tag has on message
recovery.
In the previous section we considered heirarchical QAM constellations for ease
of implementation as well as clarity of discussion. At high SNR, it becomes easy
for the receiver to distinguish the constellation points. Therefore, for stealth
purposes we can also consider the use of arbitrarily distributed tags rather than
using fixed modulation points. Suppose that the additive noise is Gaussian so
that we add Gaussian tags. While the tags become more stealthy since they
appear more noise-like, they also add more interference to the message symbols
because the magnitude of the tag is no longer strictly limited. Figure 3.3 shows
the message BER when the tags are either 4QAM or Gaussian. Clearly, the
hierarchical constellation is a much better choice in terms of message BER; the
Gaussian tags cause the message BER to hit an error floor. This can be explained
because the effective SNR can be written
γ̃ =
ρsσ2x








where again σ2x, σ
2
w are the signal and noise powers, respectively. Note that even
as the noise power drops to zero, the effective SNR γ̃ does not go to infinity
because (1− ρs) of the signal power is dedicated to the tag. This illustrates that
there is an inherent tradeoff between stealth and security.
In general, the signal may be viewed in terms of a basis decomposition. There
are a large variety of bases to choose from, but some are more appropriate than
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Message BER for Hierarchical vs. Gaussian Tags






Figure 3.3: Message BER are compared for hierchical 4/16 QAM constellation
versus normally distributed tags. The error floor for the Gaussian tags is deter-
mined by the message/tag power allocation ρs.
others to describe the structure and impact of the authentication. Fundamen-
tally, signals cannot be limited in both time and frequency: time-limited signals
have power over infinite frequencies while band-limited signals extend for all time.
However, real signals have energy concentrated in finite time intervals and fre-
quency bands1. Bases that do not consider such tradeoffs (e.g., Fourier) offer
either very poor time or frequency resolution. Authentication tags that are com-
posed using such alphabets are not appropriate because they are neither stealthy
nor secure (Section 3.3). Furthermore, they offer limited degrees of freedom in
which to signal the authentication, which ideally is drawn from very large spaces.
Multiresolution techniques such as wavelet transforms are a more appropriate
approach since they give basis coefficients which are localized in both time and
frequency (Figure 3.4). This allows the system designer to selectively place the
1If a signal concentrates most (1−ε) of its energy in the time interval (−T/2, T/2) and band






Figure 3.4: The wavelet tiling of the time-frequency plane. The wavelet basis
yields a multi-resolution view of the signal that trades time resolution for fre-
quency resolution.
authentication tag energy where it can be simultaneously hidden from adversaries
and non-intrusive on the message recovery. One issue that arises is the potential
bandwidth expansion introduced by the authentication tag. With the appropriate
choice of basis, it is easy to control the bandwidth of the resulting signal. For
example, with the wavelet basis it is simple to place energy within the bandwidth
constraints of the message signal by restricting the use of high-frequency basis
functions.
The view of the signal via a basis decomposition allows the framework pre-
sented above to describe a large class of superimposed authentication systems.
No longer restricted to the view of the signal on a symbol-by-symbol basis, the
basis view expands the richness of the space to describe bandwidth shaping and
other realities in which the authentication can be hidden.
3.3 Metric Evaluation
We illustrate the tradeoffs of the scheme by studying an example system where
the message and tag symbols are simultaneously modulated using a hierarchical
4/16-QAM constellation (Figure 3.2). The Rayleigh block fading channel is esti-
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Table 3.1: Simulation parameters for the single carrier, Rayleigh block fading
case
Channel Model Rayleigh block fading
Noise Model AWGN
Channel Estimate Method ML
# Pilot Symbols 16 per frame
Frame Length 256, 512, or 1024 symbols
False Alarm Probability 10−7
# Monte Carlo Samples 215
mated using a 16-symbol pilot sequence within 256-symbol frames. We assume
that the receiver experiences white Gaussian noise. The Monte Carlo simulation
parameters are summarized in Table 3.1.
A range of false alarm probabilities was simulated, and the pictured false
alarm probability was chosen to give an example of a reasonable operating point.
We note that as the false alarm probability becomes smaller, the power of the
authentication test does not change much because the tails of the distribution
underH0 (3.35) are very small. With suitably low false alarms, the authentication
decisions may be trusted with high probability.
3.3.1 Stealth
We recall the two aspects of stealth: the presence and the impact of the authen-
tication tag. We discuss the two aspects in turn.
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Kullback!Leibler Distance for Various Message Powers







Figure 3.5: Stealth: KL Distance between tagged and untagged signals for various
message powers in AWGN. Higher message power makes the tag more hidden and
hence leads to better stealth.
Presence
The presence of a signal is difficult to detect when its distribution is close to the
baseline noise distribution. This fact emphasizes our view of noise as beneficial
towards stealth: our scheme cannot be stealthy in a noiseless environment. The
’closeness’ of two distributions is measured by the Kullback-Leibler distance and
is shown in Figure 3.5 for various message powers. We note that for all ρs the
scheme is hidden for low to medium SNRs (below 18dB) but is increasingly easy
to detect for higher SNRs. The intuition is that as the noise decreases, the
slight perturbations caused by the authentication become increasingly discernible.
However, it is also clear that the higher the message power (and hence the lower
the authentication power), the more well-hidden the authentication becomes.
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Frame Outage Probability for Various BCH Codes









Figure 3.6: Stealth: Frame outage probabilities for various BCH codes in the
Rayleigh fading channel. Higher message power admits lower frame outage prob-
ability and hence better stealth.
Impact
The impact of the authentication on the unaware receiver can be measured easily
by the receiver’s message outage probability.
With a reduction in SNR, we examine the increase in outage probability for
various powers of error correcting codes. Figure 3.6 shows the outage probability
of the frames (an outage occurs when a message is not recovered correctly).
Clearly more powerful codes decrease the outage probability. They also diminish
the impact of the authentication upon the message. For the BCH(255,179,10)
code, reducing the message power to 95%, 97%, and 99.5% increases the outage
probability by 0.1%, 1.1%, and 2.2%, respectively, at 18 dB. However, for the
stronger BCH(255,91,25) code, reducing the message power to 95%, 97%, and
99.5% increases the outage probability by 0.1%, 0.5%, and 1.0%, respectively, at
18 dB.
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Kullback!Leibler Distance for Various Message Powers






Figure 3.7: Robustness: KL Distance between correct and incorrect tags for
various message powers in AWGN. Lower message power makes the tag more
easily detected to Bob and hence better robustness.
3.3.2 Robustness
The robustness of the authentication is given by the ability of the aware receiver
to accurately determine the validity of any given message. Fundamentally, the
performance is limited by the Kullback-Leibler distance between the correct and
incorrect tags observed in noise. Figure 3.7 shows the KL distance for various
message powers. Immediately we see that lower message powers (and hence
higher tag powers) lead to greater distances and hence more reliable detections.
Since we authenticate only unmodified messages, in the following we assume
that the message is received correctly. For each frame, the receiver decides the
authenticity of the message using a threshold that depends on the channel es-
timate (Section 3.2.4). When the detection probability is not high enough, we
consider the performance to be insufficient. Figure 3.8 shows the authentication
outage probabilities for various message powers for false alarm α = 10−7 and
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Authentication Outage Probability for Various Message Powers
Frame Length = 256, Rayleigh Channel






Figure 3.8: Robustness: Authentication outage probabilities for various message
powers in the Rayleigh fading channel. Lower message power admits lower au-
thentication outage and hence better robustness.
minimum detection probability P a = 1−10−6. Using higher tag powers improves
the robustness of the authentication, though the benefit diminishes as the SNR
increases.
In some situations the tag power cannot be increased further due to stealth
requirements (Section 3.3.1). Another way to increase the energy of a tag is to
increase its length. This also improves the robustness of the authentication, as
shown in Figure 3.9.
The authentication performs well for high SNR, and the performance is im-
proved when the tag power is increased, the tag length is increased, when the
tag is coded over multiple messages, or when the message is sufficiently coded
for accurate recovery. When the outage probability of the authentication is very
low, it may replace conventional message authentication codes. However, in other
situations it may be used to supplement the existing authentication.
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Authentication Outage Probability for Various Frame Lengths
Message Power 97%, Rayleigh Channel






Figure 3.9: Robustness: Authentication outage probabilities for various tag
lengths in the Rayleigh fading channel. Longer frames admit higher authenti-
cation probability and hence better robustness.
3.3.3 Security
The security of the authentication system is measured by how easily Eve can
recover the secret key. Eve can try to estimate the tag and recover the key. We
consider each step in order.
Tag Equivocation
Given a particular message s and a particular tag t, there is no guarantee of
positive key equivocation unless the the number of keys is greater than the number
of tags (by the pigeonhole principle). However, observing the tag through a noisy
channel leads to positive key equivocation.
The equivocation of the authentication tag depends on the bit error rate that
it is observed with. Suppose that the authentication tag t is composed of N bits
and is observed with i.i.d. bit errors with probability pt. We can calculate the
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tag equivocation H(t|pt) by iterating through the number of bit errors the tags
can contain (between 0 and N). The probability of observing n errors in a length
N tag with bit error probability pt is
Pr(pt, n,N) = (pt)n(1− pt)N−n (3.62)
The tag bit error probability pt depends on the system parameters as described
in Section 3.2.3. For example, the system using a hierarchical 4/16-QAM constel-
lation observed through a Rayleigh channel is parametrized with tag power (ρt)2
and average SNR γ. The resulting tag bit error probability is given in equation
(3.23).
Since tags with the same number of i.i.d. bit errors have the same probability

























where Pr(·, ·, ·) is defined above in equation (3.62). We note that there is an
abuse of notation in this equation in that pt is really a constant; it does not
depend on the particular tag.
Figure 3.10 shows the tag equivocation for a 512-bit tag over a Rayleigh block
fading channel for various message powers. Higher message powers yield higher
equivocations. Note that the equivocation decreases as the SNR increases because
with less noise, the tag is less stealthy and may be more easily distinguished and
decoded. Thus with higher tag equivocation the key equivocation is similarly
increased (Chapter 2).
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Equivocation for Various Message Powers
Rayleigh Channel, Frame Length = 256






Figure 3.10: Security: Equivocation of tags for various message powers in the
Rayleigh fading channel. Higher message power leads to higher equivocation and
hence better security.
Vulnerabilities
When multiple blocks are used for the authentication, the added robustness gives
the adversary more opportunities to pass inauthentic blocks to Bob. The tradeoff
between robustness and security is fundamental - by allowing more errors in
the authentication process, Eve has a better opportunity to sneak in her own
messages. However, since messages may be coded across blocks to mitigate outage
effects, Eve’s malicious blocks will be corrected, or more likely discarded, by the
decoder. Eve must therefore be able to convince Bob to accept a stream of tagged
messages, something that is very difficult when she does not know the secret key.
3.4 Extension to Fast-Fading Channels
Thus far we have considered the slow fading channel. A natural question that
arises is how well the scheme works in fast fading channels. To tackle this ques-
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tion, we introduce another channel model and the associated channel estimation
algorithm. We find that the aware receiver can even improve his message recovery
(by trading off delay) by treating the authentication tag as pilot symbols, and
we detail the necessary changes.
3.4.1 Channel Model
Instead of the Rayleigh block fading channel, we use a Gauss-Markov channel
model to describe fast flat fading [29]. Rather than assuming a constant fade for
each block of symbols, each symbol suffers a different but correlated fade. The
channel for the kth symbol is
hk = ahk−1 + uk (3.65)
where a is the fading correlation coefficient, and uk ∼ N(0, σ2u) where σ2u =
(1−a2)σ2h. The fading correlation coefficient characterizes how quickly the channel
fades: large values (close to unity) model slow fading channels while smaller
values model fast fading channels. After passing through the channel, the receiver
observes the signal y:
yk = hkxk + wk (3.66)
yi = hi · xi + wi (3.67)
where as before wk ∼ N(0, σ2w) is white Gaussian noise. Note that we still treat
the message in blocks but now the channel is a vector h = {h1, · · · , hL}. The




By modeling the channel as a AR-1 process, we are able to use the Kalman filter







Figure 3.11: TDM Pilot Placement.
aid channel estimation but we use them more frequently because the channel is
fast fading. We have Tp pilot symbols preceding every cluster of Td data (i.e.,
message and tag) symbols and we let T = Tp + Td. Thus pilots are inserted into
x such that {xk}|(k mod T<Tp) are pilots and the rest are data. See Figure 3.11.
The channel estimation is slightly different depending on whether the tag
presence is unknown or if it is assumed to be present. The presence is unknown,
for example, by the unaware receiver, the aware receiver without the key, or the
aware receiver who hasn’t been able to verify it yet. However, once the intended
receiver verifies the presence of the tag, it may use the tag as extra information
to help estimate the channel.
Tag Presence Unknown
The equations for channel state (3.65) and observation (3.66) are used to con-
struct the filter. The filter trains itself to make increasingly accurate estimates
while it is receiving the pilot symbols pk. We have the following filter update










[Estimate] ĥk = aĥk−1
+Kk(yk − aĥk−1pk) (3.69)
[MMSE] Mk = (1−Kkpk)
·(a2Mk−1 + σ2u). (3.70)
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When the training period is over, the filter estimates the channel based on the
AR-1 model (3.65). The update equations during the data period (k mod T ≥
Tp) are:
[Channel Estimate] ĥk = aĥk−1




The channel estimate for the ith block is the vector ĥi.
Tag Assumed Present
The aware receiver with the secret key can potentially obtain a better channel
estimate than the unaware receiver. Recall that for authentication, our authen-
tication tags must be known at the receiver. Therefore they may be used for
channel estimation, in exactly the way as pilot symbols, provided that the tag is
indeed present. The receiver that uses this information operates as follows. As
soon as it can generate the estimated tag using (3.10), it uses t̂i to adaptively
track the channel during data symbol reception. Because the channel estimation
does not change during the pilot symbol reception, equations (3.68) - (3.70) do
not change.
When the data symbols are received however, the Kalman filter continues to
update and track the signal by using the tag which it decides is present. Assuming
that the estimated tag is present, we rewrite the observation
yk = ρ
shksk + ρ
thktk + wk (3.71)
= ρthktk + vk (3.72)
Note that vk ∼ N(0, (ρs)2σ2h + σ2w). The update equations during the training
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[Estimate] ĥk = aĥk−1
+Kk(yk − aρtĥk−1tk) (3.74)
[MMSE] Mk = (1− ρtKktk)
·(a2Mk−1 + σ2u) (3.75)
Comparing equations (3.73)-(3.75) with (3.68)-(3.70) reveals that σ2w is replaced
with σ2v and pk is replaced with ρ
ttk. The channel estimate that assumes the tag
is present for the ith block is given by the vector ĥi.
3.4.3 Message Recovery
Tag Presence Unknown





and uses equation (3.20) to recover the message symbols as before.
Tag Assumed Present
If the receiver decides that the tag is present, not only can it remove it prior
to message estimation, it can also use the improved channel estimate ĥ+i . The











and uses equation (3.20) to recover the message symbols as before.
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3.4.4 Authentication
The authentication process remains unchanged. Of course, the channel estimate
used in the tag detection should not use the tag as pilot symbols, otherwise the
reasoning is circular (testing the tag presence while assuming that it is there for
channel estimation).
3.4.5 Example and Results
The following results are obtained when both tag and message are modulated
using 4-QAM. The resultant constellation is the 4/16 hierarchical QAM constel-
lation (Figure 3.2). Two pilot symbols precede every cluster of 8 message and
tag symbols (Tp = 2, Td = 8), and the channel is tracked using a Kalman filter.
The Monte Carlo simulation parameters are summarized in Table 3.2.
A range of false alarm probabilities was simulated, and the pictured false
alarm probability was chosen to give an example of a reasonable operating point.
We note that as the false alarm probability becomes smaller, the power of the
authentication test does not change much because the tails of the distribution
underH0 (3.35) are very small. With suitably low false alarms, the authentication
decisions may be trusted with high probability.
Figure 3.12 shows that as in the Rayleigh fading case, increasing message
power improves the stealth of the system. It also shows the impact of message
power upon frame outages and the importance of error correction codes in fast
fading channels.
Since we authenticate only unmodified messages, in the following we assume
that the message is received without error. Figure 3.13 shows that as in the block
fading case, the message and tag power plays a significant role in the robustness of
authentication. Again, we note that the benefit of using higher powers diminishes
75
Table 3.2: Simulation parameters for the single carrier, Gauss-Markov channel
case
Channel Model Gauss-Markov (AR-1)
Noise Model AWGN
Channel Estimate Method Kalman filtering
# Pilot Symbols 2 pilots every 8 data symbols
Frame Length 128 symbols
False Alarm Probability 10−3
# Monte Carlo Samples 215

























Frame Outage Probability for Various BCH Codes









Figure 3.12: AR-1 Stealth: Frame outage probabilities for various BCH codes
in the AR-1 channel with a = 0.99. Higher message power admits lower frame
outage probability and hence better stealth.
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Probability of Authentication for Various Message Powers






Figure 3.13: AR-1 Robustness: Frame authentication probabilities for various
message powers in the AR-1 channel with a = 0.99. Lower message power admits
higher authentication probability and hence better robustness.
at higher SNR.
Finally, Figure 3.14 shows that while the high BER induced by the channel
is detrimental to robustness, it is favorable for security as it obscures the tag
symbols very well. The equivocation of each 128 symbol = 256 bit tag is near
the maximum (256) for reasonably high message powers as shown in the figure.
The more uncertainty that is present in the channel (e.g., low SNR), the better
the security and the less it depends on the message power.
3.5 Conclusion
We have presented a flexible framework for describing and analyzing a large family
of physical layer authentication schemes that can be built over existing transmis-
sion systems. Authentication information is sent concurrently with data without
requiring extra bandwidth or transmission power. With these constraints, en-
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Equivocation for Various Message Powers







Figure 3.14: AR-1 Security: Equivocation of tag symbols for various message
powers in the AR-1 channel with a = 0.99. Higher message power leads to higher
equivocation and hence better security.
ergy is allocated away from the data signal to the authentication signal, thereby
increasing the probability of error of data recovery.
However, with a long enough authentication code word a useful authentication
system can be achieved with very slight data degradation. Alternatively, it is also
possible to place the authentication over multiple frames to further improve the
system’s robustness.
We have also presented the extension of the framework to fast-fading channels.
Coding is essential in such channels to combat the high bit error rates so that
authentication can proceed. At the same time, it is the high bit error rates
that offer such good security properties so that the adversary gains very little




4.1 Overview of Contributions
In this chapter we extend the previous chapter’s framework to describe authenti-
cation over multiple carriers. We expand the framework to handle unequal per-
carrier power allocations and inter-carrier interference [31]. The added flexibility
of having multiple carriers introduces new possibilities: varying tag placements
over the carriers on a frame-by-frame basis, varying the density of the tags, and
allocating unequal powers to each carrier [32].
We give a preview of the results as follows.
• We extend the framework of the previous chapter to allow the authentica-
tion to be transmitted over multiple carriers (Section 4.2).
• The number of unique carriers used to transmit the authentication tags is a
major determining factor in the performance of the system. Spreading the
authentication over more carriers improves stealth, robustness, and security
(Sections 4.2.4 and 4.3). However, practical considerations such as hardware
limits and quantization resolutions cap the number of carriers that can
actually be used (Section 4.2.5).
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• The errors introduced through a non-zero frequency offset and imperfect
channel estimation degrade the performance of the authentication but may
be overcome through careful selection of parameters: tag power, length,
and density (Section 4.3).
• The availability of multiple carriers introduces additional degrees of freedom
for hiding and securing the authentication. As a logical extension towards
unequal power allocations, the authentication tags can exist on only a subset
of the frame: that is, over specific carriers during specific times only. This
further complicates the adversary’s goal of defeating the authentication
because she does not know where the tag is located (Section 4.3.3).
• When the adversary does not know where the authentication is located, it
is more difficult for her to gain relevant information from her observations.
Indeed, if she extracts data where none is present, she can effectively poison
her cache of previously collected data (Section 4.3.3).
• When channel state information is available at the transmitter, the tag
power allocation between carriers is another major factor in authentication
performance. A simple strategy of proportional power allocation between
message and tag is shown to yield a good compromise between the metrics
(Section 4.4).
4.2 Framework
A note on notation: Bold face indicates matrices (e.g. A). Upper case indicates




Suppose that Alice and Bob communicate using multiple carriers. In general,
some carriers will be nulled out for spectral shaping purposes, but this does not
have a significant impact on the authentication framework. Therefore we ignore
the null carriers and assume that there are N > 1 message carriers.
The signals are transmitted in frames represented by size N × N f matrices
where N f is the frame length. We assume the signals are i.i.d. and so we do not
use time indices. Denote the transmitted signal by the random matrix X with
complex entries {X(m,n)} that have variance σ2x. We constrain the energy as
given by its Frobenius norm
|X|2 = Trace(XHX) (4.1)
E|X|2 = NN fσ2x (4.2)
First we consider untagged signals which are message-only (contain no au-
thentication). The transmitted signal is
X = ρS (4.3)
where ρ is a N ×N diagonal scaling matrix and S is a N ×N f message matrix
satisfying
E[S(m,n)] = 0 (4.4)
E[|S(m,n)|2] = σ2x (4.5)∑
m,n
I(S(m,n)) = NN f (4.6)
where I(·) is the indicator function. That is, the message symbols have zero
mean and variance σ2x, and they occupy each of the NN
f symbol positions in
the frame. The term ρ is used to allocate power among the carriers such that
equations (4.2) and (4.3) are satisfied.
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The tagged signals are formed by superimposing the authentication tag T
with the message S:
X = ρsS + ρtT (4.7)
where ρs, ρt are N ×N diagonal scaling matrices and T is a N ×N f tag matrix
satisfying
E[T (m,n)] = 0 (4.8)
E[|T (m,n)|2] = σ2xI(T (m,n)) (4.9)∑
m,n
I(T (m,n)) = N tN f (4.10)
Note that the tag symbols occupy N tN f out of a possible NN f symbol positions
with 0 ≤ N t ≤ N . When present, each tag symbol has zero mean and variance
σ2x. N
t specifies the spread of the tag across the symbols; a large spread indicates
that the tag energy is very spread out over many symbols while a small spread
indicates that the tag energy is concentrated over only a few symbols. Figure
4.1a is an example of how the tag symbols may be scattered across carriers.
Alternatively, the tag symbols may also occupy specific carriers as in Figure 4.1b.
In this case, N t is the number of carriers that are occupied by the authentication
tag.
Denote the kth row of a matrix by (·)k. For diagonal matrices such as ρ we
slightly abuse the notation to write ρk , ρ(k, k). The terms ρs, ρt are chosen to
normalize the energy of tagged and untagged signals on each carrier:
E|ρSk|2 = E|ρskSk + ρtkTk|2 (4.11)
where
We assume that the message and tag are uncorrelated




Message and Tag symbol
timecarrier
Figure 4.1: Example tag placements with N = 4, N f = 8 and tag spread N t = 2.
a) tag on specific carriers only, b) general tag placement.









Note that |ρs|2 (resp. |ρt|2) is simply the overall percentage of power allocated
to the message (resp. tag) symbols. The untagged signal is a special case of the
tagged signal where ρs = ρ and ρt = 0. We thus use the more general formulation
of equation (4.7) to represent both tagged and untagged signals.
Alice wants to send the message B to Bob. They also share a secret key
k ∈ K, where |K| = K. The messages and tags are generated as follows
S = fe(B) (4.14)
T = g(B, k) (4.15)
where fe(·) is the message encoding function and g(·) is the tag generation func-
tion. The encoding function fe(·) encapsulates any coding, modulation, or pulse
shaping that may be used. The corresponding decoding function fd(·) is used at
the receiver and satisfies
B = fd(fe(B)) (4.16)
for all possible inputs B of fe(·). For example, suppose that fe(·) applies a cyclic
code (such as Reed-Solomon (RS) and Bose-Chaudhuri-Hocquneghem (BCH))
83
to the raw data B. Then the corresponding decoder fd(·) can implement the
Berlekamp-Massey algorithm [33] to efficiently decode the message.
The tag generating function g(·) is assumed to be one-way, i.e., it is easy1 to
calculate T given B and k, but hard to find k given T and B. Further, it is
collision resistant so that it is hard to find X 6= Y such that g(X, k) = g(Y, k).
This property ensures resistance against the substitution attack (Section 4.3.3).
The transmitted (time domain) signal x is obtained by taking the IDFT of X
x = IDFT[X] (4.17)
= FHX (4.18)





and 0 ≤ m,n ≤ N − 1.
4.2.2 Channel Model and Estimation
We assume a block fading multipath channel. The channel ~h is modeled as a





where α(·) are i.i.d. complex zero-mean Gaussian random variables with variance
N/L.
The frequency response of the channel is
H = diag(F~h) (4.21)
1The concept of hard and easy calculations is characterized by their feasibility. Hard cal-
culations are infeasible to compute given constraints on computational resources, while easy
calculations are feasible to compute under the same constraints.
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where ~h is zero-padded to N , the length of the FFT (equation (4.19)). Note
that the frequency response per carrier has unit expected variance (σ2h = 1). We
use the convention that diag(X) returns the main diagonal of (matrix) X as a
column vector while diag(~x) returns the diagonal matrix with (vector) ~x on the
main diagonal.
Cyclic prefixes with length N g ≥ L are inserted at the transmitter and re-
moved at the receiver to eliminate intersymbol interference (ISI) and to make
the convolution circular over the frame. Thus the convolutive channel may be
written as a circulant matrix h̃ with entries
h̃(m,n) = h((m− n) mod N) (4.22)
After stripping the cyclic prefix, the receiver has the observation
y = h̃x + w (4.23)






The receiver takes the FFT of the observation y to work in the frequency
domain. In general, the oscillators of the transmitter and receiver have a non-
zero frequency offset ε and timing error θ. Synchronization may be done by taking
advantage of the cyclic prefix [34] or an inserted preamble [35]. The frequency
domain signal at the receiver is
Yε,θ = e−jθYε (4.24)
where Yε = DFT[y] (4.25)
= FEy (4.26)
= FEh̃FHX + W (4.27)
= HεX + Zε + W (4.28)
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where
E = diag(exp(j2πεm/N)) (4.29)












N sin(π(l − k + ε)/N)
(4.33)
In the perfect synchronization case we have ε = 0 and E = I. Since h̃ is cir-
culant, Fh̃FH is diagonal and therefore Z = 0. Therefore there is no intercarrier
interference (ICI) when the frequency offset is zero.
We use pilot symbol assisted modulation (PSAM) to estimate the channel.
The proposed authentication scheme only modifies the message symbols; no con-
trol symbols such as pilots are perturbed. The pilot symbols and subsequent
channel estimates are transparent to our method, but we characterize the esti-
mation noise in the following.
The channel is held constant over the entire message by the slow fading as-





where P are the known pilot symbols and Yp are the corresponding observa-
tions. This zero-forcing estimate performs poorly with severely attenuated carri-
ers which is a hallmark of fading channels, and thus we use the LMMSE estimate
[36]





The LMMSE estimate may be simplified by substitutingE[(PPH)−1] for (PPH)−1
in equation (4.35) [37]. The simplified estimator may thus be written as the di-
agonal matrix










β = E[PPH ]E[(PPH)−1] (4.38)
β is a constant that depends on the constellation of P. Note that when P is
constant modulus (e.g., 4QAM), the simplified estimator gives the same channel
estimate, i.e., Ĥ = diag(~Hmmse).








for 0 ≤ m,n ≤ N − 1.
The channel estimate may viewed as a noisy observation of the true channel
Ĥ = Hε + η (4.41)
where η is the channel estimation error. Note that η is a diagonal matrix since
H and Hε are both diagonal.


















The error η can be approximated by a zero-mean Gaussian random variables with
variance σ2η.
4.2.3 Message Recovery
Using the channel estimate, the receiver estimates the message signal as
Ŝ = Ĥ−1Y (4.46)
= Ĥ−1(HεX + Zε + W) (4.47)
= X + Ĥ−1(−ηX + Zε + W) (4.48)
= X + Ĥ−1W̃ (4.49)
The estimated message is
B̂ = fd(Ŝ) (4.50)
where fd(·) is the decoding function corresponding to the encoder fe(·) from
equation (4.16).
Now let us consider the uncoded bit error probability of the symbols. For
analysis, we assume that the message and tag symbols are modulated using QAM.
For example, when the message and tag symbols are both modulated with 4-
QAM, the tag constellation is superimposed on each message symbol to form
the constellation shown in Figure 3.2. In the literature this is called the 4/16
hierarchical QAM constellation [27]. Note that the constellation has 16 symbols;
each symbols signals both message (which quadrant) and tag (which point in the
quadrant) information.
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To calculate the BER for hierarchical QAM constellations, we must know
the distance between the symbols as well as the noise power (Figure 3.2). 2d1
is the minimum distance between any two (fictitious) message points, 2d2 is the
minimum distance between any two tag points within the same quadrant, and 2d′1
is the minimum distance between points in adjacent quadrants. We first give the
exact BER expressions for unit-energy 4/16 constellations and then apply them
to the authentication signals. In general, any number of QAM constellations
may be superimposed on each other and the corresponding closed form BER
expressions are given in [27].





















(Ψ(1, 0) + Ψ(1, 2)) (4.52)
























(2Ψ(0, 1) + Ψ(2, 1) + Ψ(2, 3)) (4.54)
The helper function Ψ(·) is used in the BER calculations above, and depends on
the channel distribution. For the Rayleigh channel with unit power constellations
it is




1 + (ad′1 + bd2)
2γ
(4.55)
The noise power N0 is the average noise power for a unit variance channel. For
perfect channel information, 1/γ, while for MMSE estimation it is 1/γlmmse >
1/γ.
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We now evaluate the parameters for the BER expressions in equations (4.51)
and (4.53) for two cases: when the message symbol is tagged and when it is not.
Case 1: Tagged message symbol
For a symbol on carrier k that contains both message and tag, we have that
the message symbol is scaled by ρsk and the tag symbol is scaled by ρ
t
k. Since the
symbols are each unit variance, the effective SNR is [(ρsk)
2+(ρtk)
2]/σ2w. In order to

































d′1 = d1 − d2 ≥ 0 (4.61)
We calculate the BER of the message and tag bits by using these values in
equations (4.51) and (4.53) respectively. Note that equations (4.59)-(4.61) require
that ρ̃sk > ρ̃
t




k. Otherwise, the decision boundaries will
overlap.
Case 2: Untagged message symbol
When a message symbol on carrier k stands alone without any superimposed
tag, it uses the 4-QAM constellation. Note that it is still scaled by the term ρsk,
and thus the effective SNR is (ρsk)
2/σ2w. Once again we scale in order to make the
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constellation unit energy:
ρ̃sk = 1 (4.62)













d2 = 0 (4.66)
d′1 = d1 (4.67)
The overall BER of the system is calculated by combining the results of cases
1 and 2. Recall that the expected number of tagged message symbols on carrier
k is E|Tk|2. By using psk,1, psk,2 to denote the message BER for the cases 1 and 2
respectively and similarly ptk,1, p
t


























In the above we have assumed that each carrier transmits the same number of bits
on each carrier; otherwise, the BER calculation would have to be weighted differ-
ently for each carrier. This is potentially the case when channel state information
is available at the transmitter (Section (4.4)).
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4.2.4 Tag Recovery
With his estimate of the data B̂, Bob uses g(·) from equation (4.15) to reconstruct
the estimated tag:
T̂ = g(B̂, k) (4.70)
Bob uses matched filtering to detect it in his observation Y. He calculates
the residual R by removing the message and then correlates it with the estimated
tag to obtain the test statistic τ .
R = Y − ρsĤfe(B̂) (4.71)
τ = <(tr((ρtĤT̂)HR)) (4.72)
The receiver decides between the hypotheses
H0 : T̂ is not present in R (4.73)
H1 : T̂ is present in R (4.74)
The authentication decision δ is made according to the threshold test
δ =
 0 τ < τ 01 τ ≥ τ 0 (4.75)
where the threshold τ 0 is determined for a false alarm probability α according
to the distribution of (τ |H0). As in the single carrier case, the authentication
is low-complexity because the required tag generation and correlation are simple
operations.
We now turn our attention to the performance of the authentication test. We
first consider the false alarm probability and how the threshold is calculated.




In order to limit the false alarm probability α, we calculate the threshold τ 0 such
that P (τ > τ 0|H0) ≤ α. There are two cases where a false alarm can occur:
when the observation contains no tag at all or when the observation contains an
incorrect tag.
We assume that the message is recovered without error because that is when
authentication is useful. That is, B̂ = B. Consider the structure of the residual
R
R = HεX + Zε + W − ρsĤS (4.76)
= (Hε + η − η)X + Zε + W − ρsĤS (4.77)
= Ĥ(X− ρsS)− ηX + Zε + W (4.78)
= Ĥ(X− ρsS) + W̃ (4.79)






We consider the two cases where a falase alarm can occur: when the signal
contains no tag or when it contains an invalid tag. The cases differ in the content
of the signal X.
Case 1: the transmitted signal does not contain any tag (i.e., X = ρS). Then
τ |H0 = <(tr((ρtĤT̂)HR)) (4.80)
= <
(








where v is a real Gaussian variable with zero mean and variance σ2v = |ρt|2|Ĥ|2|T̂|2σ2w̃.
Consider the term <(tr(T̂HS)). It is a sum of N tN f i.i.d. variables and is
well approximated by a Gaussian distribution when N tN f is large (central limit
theorem). The mean is zero (4.12) and the variance depends on the symbol
93
constellations. For example, if the message and tag are composed of QPSK




Thus the test statistic τ is Gaussian with zero mean and variance
σ2τ = |ρt|2|ρ− ρs|2|Ĥ|4σ2ts + σ2v (4.83)
Case 2: the transmitted signal contains a tag different from estimated tag
(i.e., T 6= T̂). Then
τ |H0 = <(tr((ρtĤT̂)HR)) (4.84)
= <(tr((ρtĤT̂)H(ρtĤT + W̃)) (4.85)
= <(tr((ρt)2(ĤHĤ)T̂HT)) + v (4.86)
where v is defined as in case 1.
Consider the term <(tr(T̂HT)). It is a sum of N tN f i.i.d. variables and
is well approximated by a Gaussian distribution when N tN f is large (central
limit theorem). The mean is zero (4.12) and the variance depends on the symbol
constellations. For example, if the tag is composed of QPSK symbols, the variance
of <(tr(T̂HS)) is σ2ts = N tN f ∗ 14(1 + 1 + 0 + 0) =
NtNf
2
. Thus the test statistic
τ is Gaussian with zero mean and variance
σ2τ = |ρt|4|Ĥ|4σ2ts + σ2v (4.87)
Without priors that indicate which case is applicable, the threshold is calcu-
lated based on the worst case distribution from either case 1 or 2. Since both are
zero mean Gaussian distributions, the worst case has the larger variance σ̃2τ from
equations (4.83) and (4.87).
τ 0 = arg min
τ
Φ(τ/σ̃τ ) ≥ 1− α (4.88)
where Φ(·) is the standard Gaussian cumulative distribution function.
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Detection Probability
When Bob generates the correct tag (T̂ = T), the test statistic is
τ |H1 = <(tr((ρtĤT̂)HR)) (4.89)
= <(tr((ρt)2(ĤHĤ)THT)) + v (4.90)
= |ρtĤT|2 + v (4.91)
The probability of detection is
P a(γ) = 1− Φ
(




As discussed in Chapter 3, the detection probability may be raised by in-
creasing transmission power, extending the detection over multiple frames, or by
coding the message.
When multiple carriers are available to Alice and Bob, one question that
arises is how many carriers to use for authentication. A related question is how
the authentication tag should be placed: over specific carriers or randomly over
all carriers. We now turn our attention to how the usage of multiple carriers
influences the authentication probability.
Recall that there are N carriers and N tN f tag symbols per frame. With N f
symbols per carrier, this means that the tag symbols will occupy between dN te
and min(N tN f , N) carriers.
Suppose that the tag occupies n carriers. Assume that the tag symbols are
uniformly distributed among the n carriers. Recall from equation (4.91) that
|ρtĤT|2 is the mean of the test statistic when the valid authentication tag is
present. For clarity of discussion we assume that ρt scales each tagged carrier
equally and that Ĥ = H so we consider |HT|2 only. Since H is diagonal with
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unit variance entries (Section 4.2.2),























where Zj is a zero mean, unit variance Gaussian random variable. Thus Q is a
(scaled) χ2 distribution with 2n degrees of freedom. We characterize the distri-
bution by the following:
E[Q] = µ1 = N
tN f (4.98)
σ2Q = µ2 =
1
n
(N tN f )2 (4.99)
γ2 = µ4/σ
4
Q − 3 (4.100)
where γ2 is the kurtosis and µ4 is the fourth central moment of Q. Increasing n
decreases the both the variance and the kurtosis. This indicates the tightness of
the distribution about the mean and the heaviness of the tails (larger kurtosis =
heavier tail). Figure 4.2 shows the distribution of tr(Q) for various n.
Therefore, to improve the detection of the correct authentication tag, it is
beneficial to spread the tag symbols over as many independent carriers as possible.
That is, for the same spread factor N t, it is better to scatter the tag over many
carriers rather than restricting its placement to exactly N t carriers (see Figure
4.1).
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Distribution of Test Statistic
















Figure 4.2: Distribution of test statistic when N = 32, N t = 8, N f = 4. Kurtosis
values are 0.69(n = 8), 0.37(n = 16), 0.19(n = 32). Increasing n tightens the
distribution about its mean, improving tag detection performance of the receiver.
4.2.5 Practical Considerations
In the previous sections we have seen that the density of the tag Nt/N plays a
major role in the performance of the system. However, as we see in this section,
there are constraints on the number of carriers. We will first see why there is a
minimum density requirement in order to maintain the stealth and security of the
system. Then, we will examine the limitations of real hardware and the upper
limit on the number of carriers that can be used for the authentication.
Lower Limit of Nt
The normalized power allocation in equation (4.13) limits the total powers of
the tagged carrier to be the same as the untagged carrier. Note, however, that
there is a fundamental difference between this allocation and that of the single-
carrier case: a high message power (ρsk)





a) Nt = 4
b) Nt = 2
c) Nt = 1
Carriers
Figure 4.3: Each tag symbol becomes less powerful as the tag is spread out over
more symbols.
anymore.
Consider the power allocation for carrier k in equation (4.13). Noting the
dependence on the ratio E|Tk|
2
E|Sk|2
≤ 1, it follows that whenever the ratio becomes
smaller, there are less tags on the carrier but the power of each tag symbol
becomes greater.
For example, suppose that there are N = 4 carriers and let N f = 1 so that
there are exactly N message symbols and N t tag symbols. Normalize the powers
so that the average power is 1. If each message symbol is transmitted at 99%
power, then each tag symbol is transmitted at N
Nt
∗1% power. Thus we have that
when N t = {4, 2, 1} the tag powers are respectively {1, 2, 4}% respectively. The
basic idea is conveyed in Figure 4.3.
In medium to high SNR regimes, the tagged symbols at this power are partic-
ularly noticeable. The observed distribution will become heavy tailed with such
large perturbations, and it becomes easier for the adversary to 1) determine that
authentication is being passed and 2) extract information about the secret key.
In order to maintain stealth and security, it is therefore necessary to impose
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a lower limit on how many symbols are used to spread the authentication tag.
This lower limit depends on the power allocation ρs and is relative the number
of carriers N since we are concerned about the ratio of message to tag symbols.
When the tag power is low, it is possible to concentrate the authentication over
a few tag symbols without risking detection.
Upper Limit of Nt
While theoretical performance forces us away from concentrating the authentica-
tion in only a few tag symbols, physical limitations can prevent us from using all
possible symbol positions given the tag power available. For example, spreading
the authentication over each message symbol may allocate infinitesimally little
power to the tag symbols, which is not possible in real devices.
A digital transceiver has analog-to-digital (A/D) and digital-to-analog (D/A)
converters connected to amplifiers. The perturbation that can be physically re-
alized is dependent on the resolution of the D/A converters which are specified
in bits. For example, a 10-bit D/A can generate distinct signals when the tag
power is (ρtk)
2 > 2−10, or about 0.1%. Beyond this lower limit for the tag power,
the signals will be identical regardless of tag content. That is, the tag will be
completely obscured by quantization noise. In the same vein, the receiver’s D/A
should have sufficient resolution to distinguish between small perturbations.
Amplifiers have a region of operation that, when saturate when exceeded and
hard-limit the output signal. This distortion is very undesirable so the input
of the amplifier is scaled to so that, with high probability, it remains within
the operation region. In OFDM systems, a serious problem is the high peak to
average power ratio (PAPR). The PAPR compares the highest power of the signal
with the RMS signal, and thus defines the dynamic range of the D/A. This means
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that the D/A must quantize a wider range with the same number of bits, which
further reduces the resolution of the input signal. PAPR reduction techniques
are able to mitigate the effects to about 6 dB.
4.3 Metric Evaluation
We now discuss the desirable properties of the authentication system: stealth,
robustness, and security. We will qualitatively and quantitatively give heuristics
for system design.
In the simulations, we assume N = 32 carriers. Each frame consists of N f = 4
OFDM symbols, for a total of 32 ∗ 4 = 128 message symbols. The Monte Carlo
simulation parameters are summarized in Table 4.1.
A range of false alarm probabilities was simulated, and the pictured false
alarm probability was chosen to give an example of a reasonable operating point.
We note that as the false alarm probability becomes smaller, the power of the
authentication test does not change much because the tails of the distribution
underH0 (4.73) are very small. With suitably low false alarms, the authentication
decisions may be trusted with high probability.
4.3.1 Stealth
The stealth of the system is measured by the inability of the adversary (Eve) to
distinguish between tagged and untagged signals. We discuss the presence and
the impact of the authentication in turn.
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Table 4.1: Simulation parameters for the multi-carrier, no CSI case
Channel Model Rayleigh block fading
Noise Model AWGN
Channel State Information? No
# Carriers 32 (4 taps)
Channel Estimate Method MMSE
# Pilot Symbols 1 OFDM symbol per frame
Frame Length 4 OFDM symbols
False Alarm Probability 10−7
# Monte Carlo Samples 214
Presence
In the previous chapter, we have seen how the presence of the tag is difficult to
detect when the power is low. In the multicarrier case we consider how the de-
tection depends on the spread of the authentication tag. Note that spreading the
authentication over more symbols decreases the amount of perturbation per sym-
bol. Conversely, concentrating the authentication over fewer symbols increases
the perturbation per symbol. Thus it is not intuitively obvious whether it is
better to hide the tag over a few high-powered bursts or over many low-powered
perturbations.
We fix the message power while varying the ratio of tag symbols and consider
the resulting Kullback-Leibler distance between tagged and untagged signals.
Figure 4.4 shows that spreading the authentication over more symbols decreases
the KL distance, and hence improves the stealth.
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Kullback!Leibler Distance for Various Tag Densities
Stealth: Tagged vs. Untagged Signals







Figure 4.4: Stealth: KL distance between tagged and untagged signals for various
Nt in AWGN. Increased tag spread (higher Nt) decreases the KL distance and
hence leads to better stealth.
Impact
We have already established the effect of message power on the message BER in
the previous chapter. Now we fix the message power and consider the effect of
spreading the authentication.
Recall from Figure 4.3 that the more the authentication is spread, the less
powerful each tag becomes. From the previous chapter, we know that the less
powerful the tag, the better the BER. On the other hand, if we concentrate the
tag power in only a few symbols, there are more symbols that do not experience
interference from the tag. It may not be immediately obvious whether it is
better to spread out the tags, and thereby slightly increase the BER of most
symbols, or to concentrate the tags, and thereby increase the BER of a few
symbols significantly while leaving the others unperturbed.
Figure 4.5 shows that for low message powers, the tag spread plays a signifi-
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BER for Various Tag Densities










Figure 4.5: Stealth: BER for various Nt in AWGN. Increased tag spread (higher
Nt) decreases the BER for a fixed message power, though the effect diminishes
as the message power increases.
cant role on the BER, where increased spreads benefit the BER. However, with
higher message powers the spread no longer matters, as the BER curves nearly
coincide. More importantly, the BER curves are so close that the packet outage
probabilities are only slightly perturbed by the presence of the authentication.
4.3.2 Robustness
We now turn our attention to ability of the receiver to make correct authentication
decisions.
Since we only authenticate unmodified messages, in the following we assume
that the message is received correctly. Let us fix the message power and consider
the effect of spreading the authentication tag over many symbols. In Section
4.2.4 we have seen that increasing Nt decreases the variance and kurtosis (tails)
of the distribution which should improve authentication performance. Intuitively,
103



























Probability of Authentication for Various Tag Densities
Message Power = 99.5%, False Alarm 10!7, Rayleigh Channel







Figure 4.6: Robustness: Authentication probabilities for various tag spreadsNt in
the Rayleigh fading channel. Spreading the tag over more symbols yields higher
authentication probability and hence better robustness.
spreading the tag over many independent carriers decreases the probability of an
outage (unacceptably low SNR) and hence is favorable for performance.
Figure 4.6 demonstrates that Nt does indeed play a major role in the authen-
tication performance. It is clearly better to transmit many lower-powered tag
symbols rather than a few higher-powered tag symbols.
The availability of multiple carriers also introduces the unwelcome effect of
inter-carrier interference (ICI). As seen in Section 4.2.2, ICI is introduced when
the oscillators of the transmitter and receiver are mismatched in frequency.
Figure 4.7 shows the authentication performance in the midst of frequency
offset. Note that the effect of the frequency offset cannot be modeled simply
as a SNR reduction when the offset ε is large, but for small ε it is a reasonable
approximation. For small ε, the effect on the authentication performance is small
and may be overcome through the methods introduced in this and the previous
chapter: increasing tag power or length, placing the authentication over multiple
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Figure 4.7: Robustness: Authentication probabilities for various frequency offsets
ε in the Rayleigh fading channel. Small offsets inflict a manageable decrease in
authentication performance.
frames, or increasing the spread of the tag.
4.3.3 Security
The security of the authentication is measured by how easily Eve can recover the
secret key. First, we will consider the equivocation of the authentication tags
in the worst case scenario where Eve knows exactly where the tags are located.
Then, we will remove that assumption so that Eve must determine where the
tag symbols are non-zero before she attempts to extract any information. If she




When the tag is observed through a noisy channel, it leads to positive key equivo-
cation. Suppose that the authentication tag is composed of M bits. For example,
with Nt = 32 and N
f = 4 there are 128 symbols. With 4QAM there are therefore
M = 256 bits.
The equivocation of the authentication tag depends on the bit error rate that
it is observed with. Suppose that the authentication tag t is composed of M bits
and is observed with i.i.d. bit errors with probability pt. We can calculate the
tag equivocation H(t|pt) by iterating through the number of bit errors the tags
can contain (between 0 and M). The probability of observing n errors in a length
M tag with bit error probability pt is
Pr(pt, n,M) = (pt)n(1− pt)M−n (4.101)
The tag bit error probability pt depends on the system parameters as described
in Section 4.2.3. For example, the system using a hierarchical 4/16-QAM constel-
lation observed through a Rayleigh frequency-selective channel is parametrized
with tag power (ρt)2 and average SNR γ. The resulting tag bit error probability
is given in equation (4.69).
Since tags with the same number of i.i.d. bit errors have the same probability

























where Pr(·, ·, ·) is defined above in equation (4.101). We note that there is an
abuse of notation in this equation in that pt is actually a constant; it does not
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Equivocation for Various Message Powers
Rayleigh Channel, 32 Carriers







Figure 4.8: Security: Equivocation of the authentication tags for various tag
spreads Nt in the Rayleigh fading channel. Spreading the tag over more symbols
yields higher tag equivocation and hence better security.
depend on the particular tag.
Since the different tag spreads yield different bit-length tags, we normalize
the equivocation as a percentage of the maximum equivocation for comparison.
For example, when a 256-bit tag is observed with 128 bits of equivocation, it
is equivalent to saying it is observed with 50% of the maximum equivocation.
Figure 4.8 shows the tag equivocation over a Rayleigh block fading channel for
various tag spreadings. It is clearly beneficial to spread the tag over as many
carriers as possible.
Next we consider the effect of ICI on the equivocation. Based on previous
results, we expect that increased ICI to favorably obscure the tag from the ad-
versary. Figure 4.9 confirms the intuition.
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Equivocation for Various Frequency Offsets
Rayleigh Channel, 32 Carriers







Figure 4.9: Security: Equivocation of the authentication tags for various fre-
quency offsets ε in the Rayleigh fading channel. Increased ε (worse ICI) yields
higher tag equivocation and hence better security.
Poisoning
When we set the density of the tag symbols N t/N below 1, some symbols do not
contain any tag information. Therefore when gathering information about the se-
cret key, the adversary needs to be careful not to extract information where there
is none to be extracted. When false information is accumulated and accepted
as true, the information is poisoned. This potentially leads Eve to the wrong
conclusion about the tag. Therefore Eve should be careful to consider that her
information is potentially false.
Eve must be able to do two things in order to recover tag, and hence key,
information:
1. Decide the presence of a tag symbol
2. Decode the content of the tag symbol
The ability of the adversary to determine the location of the tag symbols is
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limited by the stealth of the system. Suppose that when the symbol is untagged,
the adversary falsely identifies it as tagged with false alarm2 probability α. When
the symbol is tagged, the adversary correctly identifies it with probability 1− β
which is dependent on the power and structure of the tag symbols.
There are Ñ = NN f total symbols, of which Ñ t = N tN f contain superim-
posed tag symbols.
Suppose that Eve collects tag information only from symbols that she knows
for certain are tagged (that is, there are no false alarms and α = 0). By testing
each of the Ñ symbols, she can determine the presence of up to Ñ t tag symbols.
The probability of detecting exactly x tag symbols is the binomial probability






where the miss detection probability β is depends on the SNR γ and tag power
allocation ρt. From the previous sections, we know that as either γ or ρt go
down, β increases, making it more difficult for the presence of tag symbols to be
detected.
Suppose that Eve is able to decide the presence of x tag symbols that contain
xb bits, e.g., for 4-QAM symbols we have xb = 2x. Further assume that the tag
bit error probability is pt. Then the tag equivocation depends on how many of












where Pr(pt, n,M) is the probability of having n errors out of M bits when the
bit error probability is pt as defined in equation (4.101).
2Keeping the notation of detection theory, α is the probability of false alarm (type I error)
while β is the probability of a missed detection (type II error). See Chapter 1 for further
elaboration.
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When Eve observes the tags with bit error probability pt, the tag equivocation




Pr(X = x)H(TX=x|pt) (4.106)
where Pr(·) is the probability of detecting the presence of x tag symbols (equation
(4.104)) and H(·|·) is the equivocation when x symbol are detected (equation
(4.105)).
Figure 4.10 shows the effect of unknown tag positions on the key information
gained by the adversary. We note that baseline performance is given when β = 0,
which is the situation where the adversary knows the position of the entire tag
precisely. However, in actuality the stealth requirements of the authentication
(Section 4.3.1) force the detection probability to be low when the adversary sets
her false alarm probability α = 0. We see from the figure that this uncertainty is
able to drastically reduce the amount of tag information available to Eve. Clearly,
her performance is bounded by reliability of her tag detection, and we therefore
clearly see the relationship between the stealth and security of the authentication.
4.4 Power Allocation
Suppose that Alice and Bob have channel state information (CSI). Then the
transmitter can optimize the power loading across carriers to improve the message
rate. It is well known that the water-filling power allocation maximizes the
message rate for parallel Gaussian channels [38]. Thus when no authentication
tag is transmitted, the optimal power allocation is given by
Pk = (ν −Nk)+ (4.107)



































Key Information for Unknown Tag Locations, No False Alarms
Rayleigh Channel, 32 Carriers, Nt=8







Figure 4.10: Security: Key information gained when tag positions are unknown
in the Rayleigh fading channel. False alarm probability is zero. The higher the
miss detection probability the better the security.
where Pk = ρ(k, k)
2, P = ||ρ||2 and Nk = σ2w/|H(k, k)|2. We assume that
ρ is given and that the allocations ρs, ρt satisfy equation (4.13), i.e., the total
power per carrier for tagged and untagged signals is equal. We require this for
stealth purposes: if the power spectrum of the signal is different it is easy for the
adversary to detect the anomaly.
For brevity in the sequel, we denote the per-carrier powers by P sk = ρ
s(k, k)2, P tk =
ρt(k, k)2 and the total power constraints by P s = ||ρs||2, P t = ||ρt||2.
In the authentication system, we transmit message and tags simultaneously,
so the question becomes how to best allocate the power between message and



















c) Waterfill message first





a) Waterfill tag first





b) Allocate each carrier evenly
Figure 4.11: Power allocation strategies. Base bars represent noise power on the
carriers, white bars represent message power, and lightly shaded bars represent
tag power. Power allocation is 80% message and 20% tag (P s = 0.8, P t = 0.2).
4.4.1 Strategies
The water-filling allocation given above maximizes the message rate of the system
when not tag is transmitted. We consider four power allocation strategies that
are easy to implement and have different merits that we will compare in the next
section. Figure 4.11 illustrates the allocations.
By design each of the power allocation strategies yields the same signal power
per carrier as the untagged signal. This is done for stealth purposes: an abnormal
power spectrum can be easily detected and flagged as anomalous by adversaries.
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Waterfill Tag, then Message
First, allocate the tag powers P tk by water-filling with the power budget P
t.





Then, treating the tag power as noise, allocate the message powers P sk by water-
filling with the power budget P s.




(νs −Nk − P tk)+ (4.112)
This strategy is shown in Figure 4.11a. In this case, the message always occupies
at least as many carriers as the tag.
Evenly allocate
First we determine the signal powers Pk that will used on each carrier using the
total power budget P by using equations (4.107) and (4.108). Then, using the
message and tag power allocation we calculate the message and tag powers per
carrier
P sk = P
sPk (4.113)
P tk = P
tPk (4.114)
This strategy is shown in Figure 4.11b. The proportion of message to tag power
is consistent for each carrier with non-zero signal power. In this case, the message
always occupies the same carriers as the tag.
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Waterfill Message, then Tag
First, allocate the message powers P sk with the power budget P
s.





Then, treating the message power as noise, allocate the tag powers P tk with the
power budget P t.




(νt −Nk − P sk )+ (4.118)
This strategy is shown in Figure 4.11c. In this case, the tag always occupies at
least as many carriers as the message.
Maximization of Message Rate
Consider the message capacity of the kth carrier. With the message and tag










Nk + P tk
)
(4.119)
Note that the tag acts as additional noise to the message. With the water-filling












P sk > 0
0 otherwise
(4.120)
Suppose we wish to allocate power across carriers such that the message rate
is maximized. From (4.120) is clear that carriers with zero message power have
no contribution to the capacity. Thus we remove the carriers with P sk = 0 from
















P tk = P
t = 1− ||ρs||2 (4.122)
P tk ≥ 0,∀k (4.123)
P tk ≤ Pk,∀k (4.124)


















µ+k (ν − (Nk + P
t
k)) (4.125)
Since the cost function is concave and each constraint is linear, the KKT








P tk) = 0, λ ≥ 0 (4.127)
µ−k P
t
k = 0, µ
−
k ≥ 0,∀k (4.128)
µ+k (ν − (Nk + P
t
k)) = 0, µ
+
k ≥ 0,∀k (4.129)




Nk + P tk
+ µ−k − µ
+
k = λ (4.130)
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Case 1: P tk = 0. Then µ
−







+ µ−k = λ (4.131)






Nk + P tk
= λ (4.132)







− µ+k = λ (4.133)
Ambiguities remain since there are multiple power allocations that will satisfy
the above equations. To proceed further we use the following lemma. This lemma
indicates that to maximize the total capacity of two independent channels, it is
better to add any interference (e.g., tags) in the noisier of two channels.




























if and only if N1 > N2.
Together with the KKT conditions, it is clear that the optimal strategy places
the tag power in the highest noise carriers. The sum power of the tags are
distributed in cases 2 and 3. With the lemma, a single carrier can satisfy case
2. The other carriers are either dedicated to message or tag. It is easy to check
that the following algorithm yields an optimal solution (it may not be unique):
1. Define (descending) order statistics t1, . . . , tK such that N(t1) ≥ N(t2) ≥
· · · ≥ N(tK)
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2. Initialize k = arg[minl(ν −N(tl)) > 0].
3. While k ≤ K










• k = k+1
This strategy is shown in Figure 4.11d. The algorithm greedily places the tag
power in the carriers with the highest noise until there is not enough power to
entirely occupy any of the remaining carriers. At that point, the remaining tag
power is placed in the next noisiest carrier. Note that in this strategy, at most
one carrier is used to signal both message and tag.
4.4.2 Capacity

























Note that when recovering the message, the receiver treats the tag as additive
noise. However, when the tag is recovered, the message is known since is it
transmitted with higher power. This is the superimposed method outlined by
Cover [39].
The message capacities for the four strategies are shown in Figure 4.12. In
order, the best strategies are 4,3,2, and then 1. The message rate that arises from
greedily using the highest SNR carriers for message power is vastly superior to
those from other strategies. Of the four, the worst strategy in terms of message
capacity is to place the tag in the highest SNR carriers.
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Waterfill tag, then message
Even Allocation
Waterfill message, then tag
Optimal Message allocation
Figure 4.12: Message Capacity
The tag capacities for the four strategies are shown in Figure 4.13 when the
SNR = 9dB. In order, the best strategies are 1,2,3 and then 4. The performance of
the strategies with respect to tag capacities is reversed compared to the message
capacities. While the optimal message allocation (strategy 4) is the best in terms
of message capacity, it is severely penalized when it comes to tag capacity. For
authentication, maximizing the tag rate is not necessarily a priority because tags
are low rate compared to messages.
4.4.3 Authentication Metrics
In the following simulations, we assume the same basic parameters as before. The
Monte Carlo simulation parameters are summarized in Table 4.2.
A range of false alarm probabilities was simulated, and the pictured false
alarm probability was chosen to give an example of a reasonable operating point.
We note that as the false alarm probability becomes smaller, the power of the
authentication test does not change much because the tails of the distribution
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Waterfill tag, then message
Even Allocation
Waterfill message, then tag
Optimal Message allocation
Figure 4.13: Tag Capacity
underH0 (4.73) are very small. With suitably low false alarms, the authentication
decisions may be trusted with high probability.
Stealth
The stealth of the authentication system can be measured by its message through-
put and by its BER. We consider each in turn.
Throughput
The message throughput for various policies is shown in Figure 4.14. The
throughput using strategy 4 (the optimal message allocation) is consistently high
when the message power is high (P s close to P = 1). The other strategies
are more noticeably affected by the decrease in message power. However, the
throughputs are not affected in the same way.
Strategies 2 and 3 offer reasonably high throughputs when the message power
is high. There is little difference between the two, though Strategy 2 is marginally
better.
Finally, strategy 1 has the lowest throughput of the four power allocation
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Table 4.2: Simulation parameters for the multi-carrier, perfect CSI case
Channel Model Rayleigh block fading
Noise Model AWGN
# Carriers 32 (4 taps)
Channel State Information? Yes
Modulation
BPSK: SNR ≤ 7dB
4-QAM: SNR > 7 dB
16-QAM: SNR > 12 dB
64-QAM: SNR > 17 dB
Channel Estimate Method Known
# Pilot Symbols 1 OFDM symbol per frame
Frame Length 4 OFDM symbols
False Alarm Probability 10−7
# Monte Carlo Samples 214
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Waterfill tag, then message
Even allocation
Waterfill message, then tag
Optimal message allocation
Figure 4.14: Throughput for various strategies. Frame length = 32 symbols.
Average SNR = 9 dB.
strategies. By signaling the tag over the highest SNR carriers, the effective mes-
sage is lowered, thus having a substantial impact on throughput when P s is not
very close to P = 1.
Message BER
When the authentication tag is present, power is necessarily allocated away
from the message, and hence the message BER increases. The impact of the
authentication tag varies depending on the power allocation strategy.
Figure 4.15 shows the increase in BER for various strategies. The BER is the
least affected when the message power is near 1. Of the strategies, the optimal
message allocation has the best stealth: the BER is the least impacted for all
message powers.
Robustness
The robustness of the authentication system is given by its probability of au-
thentication for a given false alarm probability. We compare the effect of frame
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Waterfill message, then tag
Optimal message allocation
Figure 4.15: Stealth for various strategies. Frame length = 32 symbols. Average
SNR = 9 dB.
lengths as well as the effect of various power allocation strategies.
Figure 4.16 shows that the choice of policy can greatly impact the robustness
of the authentication system. The best performing strategy is to allocate water-fill
the tag first before water-filling the message. Strategies 1-3 have approximately
equal performance, but strategy 4 performs much worse.
Since strategy 4 places the tag at the lowest SNR carriers, the tag detection
does not receive much benefit from any frequency diversity. The tags are placed in
the highest noise regions by design in order to maximize the message throughput,
and as a result the authentication performance suffers.
Security
The stealth of the authentication system is given by the tag equivocation of the
unaware or adversarial receiver. We compare the equivocation for the policies
as shown in Figure 4.17. Note that the maximum equivocation of the tag is
determined by the number of symbols in the frame. With a 32-carrier system
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Authentication Performance for Various Power Allocations
SNR = 9dB, 32 Carriers, Frame Length 128, ! = 0.01
 
 
Waterfill tag, then message
Even allocation
Waterfill message, then tag
Optimal message allocation
Figure 4.16: Robustness for various strategies. Frame length = 32 symbols.
Average SNR = 9 dB. False alarm probability α = 0.01.
and 4 OFDM symbol packets, the maximum equivocation is 128 bits.
Clearly the power allocation that maximizes message capacity also maximizes
the tag equivocation among the policies. However, from the previous section we
see that this allocation also performs the worst in terms of authentication robust-
ness. The remaining two policies result in very similar equivocation, demonstrat-
ing that proportionally allocating power between message and authentication is a
reasonable strategy with little tradeoff. As before, higher SNR situations reduce
the tag equivocation.
4.5 Conclusion
We have extended the authentication framework for multiple-carrier systems and
have identified that the placement of the tags across the carriers is an important
performance parameter. Spreading the tags across as many tags as possible is
beneficial to stealth and robustness, but may not be possible due to the limitations
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Equivocation for Various Power Allocations




Waterfill message, then tag
Optimal message allocation
Figure 4.17: Tag equivocation for various strategies. Frame length = 32 symbols.
Average SNR = 9 dB. False alarm probability α = 0.01.
of hardware. However, we have also found that leaving some symbols untagged
makes it much more difficult for the adversary to obtain key information.
The multiple-carrier environment also leads to undesirable effects such as
frequency offset and increased channel estimation errors. However, we have shown
that for small errors they are tolerable and may be overcome through use of
increased tag energies or increased tag spread.
When channel state information is known to the transmitter, we demonstrated
that the allocation of the tag power plays a very important role in terms of
maintaining stealth and robustness. While it is possible to place tag energy so
maximize the message throughput, it is unusable for authentication. Allocating
power between message and tag at a constant ratio per carrier is shown to be a





5.1 Overview of Contributions
In this section we describe the experimental testbed that was created to validate
the theory put forth in chapters 2 and 3. We detail the hardware and software
components of the testbed, describe the test scenarios and collected data, and
finally discuss the results.
• The physical layer authentication is implemented over a software radio
testbed and demonstrated to perform well
• The stealth of the authentication is reasonable and benefits from the time-
variation of the channel
• The robustness of the authentication is shown to have a strong relationship
with the tag energy. The reliability of the authentication is shown to be
high for reasonable power allocations.
• The authentication is shown to be resistant to false alarms when incorrect
keys are used by the transmitter or receiver. This bolsters the security








Figure 5.1: A fundamental concept of software defined radios is the placement of
software as close as possible to the antennae. Only an analog-to-digital converter
(ADC) separates the software from the antenna in the receive path (a), while a
DAC is present in the transmit path (b).
5.2 Experiment Setup
The authentication scheme was implemented on GNU Radio - a software defined
radio (SDR) platform that is in active development by the open source commu-
nity. The primary concept of software radio is to have the software as close as
possible to the antenna as shown in Figure 5.1. Compared with traditional radios
where modulations and codes are defined with special circuitry, SDR shifts the
computational load from hardware to software. With the increase in processing
power and the associated decrease in cost, SDR is becoming a more and more
viable solution for powerful and adaptable radios. Practically speaking, the SDR
paradigm increases the speed and ease of prototyping, testing, and configuring
new radios.
For our experiment, we do not modify the hardware, but we make exten-
sive software-side extensions to implement the authentication. However, since
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the hardware imposes limitations on the authentication (Chapters 2 and 3), we
first detail the relevant hardware specifications. Then, we detail our software
implementation of the physical layer authentication scheme over the GNU radio
platform.
5.2.1 Hardware Capabilities
The software interfaces with the radio transceiver via USB (universal serial bus)
interface. The radio transceiver in our experiment is the Universal Software Ra-
dio Peripheral (USRP, pronounced ”usurp”) which is the most popular and com-
monly available peripheral used by the GNU Radio project. As seen in Figure 5.2,
the USRP consists of a USB interface, an FPGA (field-programmable gate array),
ADCs and DACs (analog-digital and digital-analog converters, respectively), and
daughterboards. The daughterboards are responsible for the frequency tuning
and conversion between IF and RF (intermediate and radio frequencies, respec-
tively), and are swappable for flexible configuration. In the following we detail
the signal receive path to highlight the design of the hardware.
Daughterboard RFX2400
The signal is captured by an antenna attached to an RFX2400 daughterboard.
The RFX2400 is a 2.3-2.9GHz band transceiver with a 20MHz transmit/receive
bandwidth. The received signal passes through a mixer to downcovert the signal
to the IF1. Then, the signal is then amplified up to 70dB via AGC (automatic
1By converting signals to an IF rather than going directly between RF and baseband, the
quality of the circuit can be vastly improved (by allowing use of crystal filters, for example).
Receivers which do this are called superheterodyne for their use of the heterodyne principle






















Figure 5.2: An overview of the hardware setup: the laptop is connected via
USB to the USRP. The USRP consists of an FPGA responsible for up/down
conversions, ADCs and DACs, and various plug-in daughterboards.
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gain control) before being sent to the USRP motherboard.
USRP
The USRP board has four 12-bit ADCs that are capable of processing up to 64
mega-samples per second from the daughterboards. Depending on configuration,
these channels may contain either real or paired I/Q (in-phase and quadrature,
respectively) samples.
The digitized samples are then sent to the FPGA2. The FPGA uses a numer-
ically controlled oscillator (NCO) to convert the samples from IF to baseband.
Then CIC (cascaded integrator-comb) filters are used to decimate the oversam-
pled signal to lower the data rate. This paring down is the DDC (digital down
conversion) and is necessary for transmission over the USB 2.0 interface. The re-
sultant total bandwidth over all channels is limited to 32 megabytes/sec: 16-bit
signed integers in I/Q format, i.e., 4-bytes per complex sample at 8 megasam-
ples/sec. Of course, lower bandwidths are possible by setting the decimation
factor, e.g. 64 MHz/250 = 256kHz. Finally, the samples are transmitted to the
computer via USB.
The transmit path is essentially the reverse of the receive path. Digital sam-
ples arrive at the USRP via USB and are interpolated and up-converted to the
IF. Then they are passed through DACs and sent to the daughterboard, where
they are mixed to the RF, amplified, and transmitted over the antenna.
Laptops
We use two identical 2.0 GHz Pentium M laptops with 512 MB RAM. Each runs
Ubuntu Linux 7.04 (Feisty Fawn) with the GNU Radio software installed. The
2Altera Cyclone EP1C12 chip
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software is extended for physical layer authentication capability as described in
Section 5.2.2. One laptop controls the transmitter; the other controls the receiver.
5.2.2 Software Design
We modified the GNU Radio platform to add authentication at the physical
layer. It was written with a combination of C++ and Python for a good tradeoff
between processing speed and rapid prototyping. The signal processing blocks
(e.g., filters, phase locked loops) were written in C++ and joined together in
Python.
For this experiment we modified existing signaling blocks and also created our
own. In the following, we detail the changes made to the transmit and receive
paths.
Transmitter
Figure 5.3 shows a diagram of the transmitter. The original system takes the
payload and constructs a packet around it. It adds a preamble, access code,
header, and cyclic redundancy check (CRC) (Figure 5.4). The packet is then
DBPSK-modulated, pulse shaped, and transmitted.
To implement the authentication, we made the following changes. We added
a tag creation block that generates the authentication tag from the payload and
a secret key. Then, the authentication tag was padded to align the tag with the
message payload (Figure 5.4). The message packet and padded tag are scaled and
superimposed - the padding ensures that only the message payload is perturbed
and that the important header information is untouched. In general we may
choose to perturb the entire packet. However, since the header may be used for















Figure 5.3: Transmitter signal path. Unmodified processing blocks are grayed











Figure 5.4: Packet format. Note that the tag has non-null information coinci-
dent with the packet payload; no other portion fo the packet is modified by the
superposition.
In our implementation we use binary signaling for the authentication tag:
we either increase or decrease the voltage of a payload symbol depending on
each particular tag bit. This has the nice property of being easy to decode over
DBPSK-modulated messages since the receiver only has to observe the symbol
amplitude and not the symbol phase.
Receiver
Figure 5.5 shows a diagram of the receiver. The receiver performs automatic gain
control (AGC), root-raised cosine (RRC) filtering, timing (Mueller and Muller al-
gorithm) and phase (Costas loop) synchronization before DBPSK demodulation.
















Figure 5.5: Receiver signal path. Unmodified processing blocks are grayed out;
modifications are darkened.
that indicates the beginning of a packet. After finding the access code, it then
verifies the integrity of the header and extracts the payload with CRC. The
payload is then checked with the CRC. If the redundancy check fails the packet
is discarded; otherwise it is accepted.
To obtain the tag, we modified the DBPSK module to return not only the
demodulated symbols but the raw analog samples. The sampled signals are paired
and together pass through each subsequent block until the payload is verified. If
the payload passes the CRC check, the signals proceed to the tag detection block;
otherwise the samples are discarded and no further processing is done.
With a successful CRC check, the sampled signal arrives at the tag detec-
tion block. The verified payload (symbols) and the receiver’s secret key are used
to generate the authentication tag. The receiver takes the analog signal corre-
sponding to the payload (Figure 5.4) and correlates them with the tag. When
the correlation exceeds the threshold chosen to limit false alarms, the packet is
deemed authentic and accepted.
5.3 Testing Procedure and Results
The transmit and receive stations were placed approximately 20 feet apart with-
out a line of sight. The transceivers operate at 2.44 GHz to avoid strong inter-
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ference from the campus wireless network and from cordless telephones.
The receiver continuously scans the channel for packets. The transmitter
sends 48k (4 ∗ 210) packets at 500 kbps. We used two payload lengths: 128 and
192 bytes, of which 4 bytes are set aside as pilot symbols. For each packet length,
we consider the following test scenarios (TS):
TS 1) The transmitter does not transmit any authentication.
TS 2) The transmitter superimposes the authentication on the packets but its
secret key does not match that of the receiver.
TS 3) The transmitter superimposes the authentication on the packets and its
secret key matches that of the receiver.
The receiver should reject the packets in cases 1 and 2, and only accept the
packets in case 3. Accepting a packet in case 1 is the most innocuous false alarm.
In case 2, accepting a packet leads to a security breach since the keys do not
match. For cases 2 and 3, where the authentication is present, the experiments
were repeated at 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, . . . , 1.0% authentication powers.
The following data sets (DS) were collected:
DS 1) Digitized signal samples
DS 2) Number of received packets (error-free)
DS 3) Number of authenticated packets
The interpretation of the data depends on the test scenario and are discussed


























Figure 5.6: The test scenarios and data sets are used to evaluate the authenti-
cation system. The data collected in each test scenario is used to compute the
stealth, robustness, or stealth metrics.
5.3.1 Stealth
We quantify the stealth of the authentication system based on the impact and
presence of the authentication tags. These are measured by packet error rate
and noise distribution, respectively. The packet error rate indicates the impact
of the authentication on message recovery. The noise distribution indicates the
detectability of the perturbation to the unaware receiver.
Impact of Authentication
The impact of the authentication upon the receiver is found by comparing the
number of packets received without error (DS 2) between the scenarios when
the authentication is absent versus when it is present (TS 1 vs. TS 2 and 3).
Since there are many factors which affect how packets are dropped (e.g., not
detected, failed header check, failed CRC) which may be due to time variation
of the channel, we repeat the experiment multiple times. The impact of the
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Packet Error Rate during Different Experiments
Figure 5.7: The packet error rate for various sample runs versus the power of
the authentication signal. At low authentication powers, no significant deviation
from the baseline packet error rate was observed. Each line represents a different
test run.
authentication is found by determining how adding the authentication causes the
packet error rate increase.
The observed packet error rates are shown in Figure 5.7. We observe no
conclusive link between authentication power and packet error rate for the range
of authentication powers tested. At such low authentication power, we suggest
that the perturbation has a minimal impact and that the time-varying nature
of the channel plays a much greater role on the packet error. This confirms the
analysis in chapter 2.
Figure 5.8 is a snapshot of observed SNR across consecutive frames for var-
ious values of authentication power. The SNR values are obtained through the
use of pilot symbols. We note that the SNR is not noticeably degraded with
the addition of low power authentication tags; rather, the time variation of the
channel plays a much larger role in the measured SNR. We calculate the 95%
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confidence interval that the received signal does not contain authentication. In
this particular snapshot, the majority of the packet SNR in three cases fall inside
the 95% confidence interval. For those SNRs that fall outside of the interval,
most are actually false alarms (when no authentication is transmitted).
5.3.2 Presence
The previous section established that the packet reception is minimally impacted
when the authentication is injected at low power. Now we turn our attention to
the distortion that is observed by the receiver. For each packet that is received
correctly, we record the amplitude distortion (DS 1).
We study the noise by calculating the empirical cumulative distribution func-
tion (CDF) of the amplitude distortion over thousands of packets. The baseline
distribution yields the noise characteristics of the channel under normal condi-
tions, i.e., when no authentication is transmitted.
The presence of the authentication system is hidden when the resultant noise
distribution at the receiver is close to the baseline. When the noise distribution
is not close, its presence can be discovered through the use of goodness of fit
tests. Assume that the receiver knows the baseline noise CDF, perhaps through
training with a known transmitter. The receiver can compare the observed noise
statistics with the baseline CDF in order to determine whether the signal is being
perturbed. The tests operate at a user-specified probability of false alarm which
is usually set very low to return useful detections.
Figure 5.9 shows the CDF for some representative authentication powers.
The CDF are further apart when the authentication power increases. In theory,
goodness of fit tests will therefore reject the distributions as being unequal when
the authentication power is too high.
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95% Confidence: No Authentication
Figure 5.8: The observed SNR of tagged and untagged signals for a few consec-
utive packets. The majority of the packet SNR in three cases fall inside the 95%
confidence interval for no authentication present in the signal; in this snapshot























Figure 5.9: The observed CDF of the estimated noise for various authentication
powers over thousands of packets. Larger authentication powers deviate more
from the baseline CDF.
However, we found that the time-variation of the channels inhibits good per-
formance of the tests. Using the Kolomogorov-Smirnov test with a 1% false alarm
probability over a window of a few hundred packets, the receiver correctly flags
the tagged signals as anomalous. However, the receiver also flags the untagged
signals as anomalous - even though no authentication was being transmitted.
Thus the receiver needs more powerful techniques to discriminate between pure
noise and perturbation in noise - the KS test is not able to distinguish between
tagged and untagged signals reliably.
The fact that it is difficult to discriminate using goodness of fit tests indicates
that stealth may be further improved by time-multiplexing the authentication.
That is, the receiver is faced with a more difficult anomaly detection problem
when the authentication tags are injected into some, but not all, of the packets.
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Table 5.1: Authentication Probability
Tag Power
0 0.001 0.005 0.010
L = 128 0.001 0.391 0.999 1.000
L = 192 0.001 0.973 1.000 1.000
5.3.3 Robustness
We quantify the robustness of the authentication system by its authentication
probability for a fixed false alarm probability. We have the transmitter and
receiver share the same key (TS 3) and analyze the number of authenticated
packets (DS 3) for both 128 and 192-byte payloads.
The detection probabilities are found in Table 5.1. With the same power
allocation, longer authentication tags have more energy and thus result in higher
quality decisions. For example, increasing the payload from 128 to 192 bytes
increases the detection probability from 39% to 97%.
The test statistics with 128-byte payloads are shown in Figure 5.10(a) for
various authentication powers. The experiment is repeated for 192 byte payloads
as shown in Figure 5.10(b). The statistics are clearly separated from the untagged
signal case (no authentication transmitted), even for very low authentication
power. Increasing the perturbation length increases the energy, and hence the
performance of the authentication improves as well. We see that there is a clear
relationship between the energy of the authentication and its performance.
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(a) L = 128 Histogram






















(b) L = 192 Histogram
Figure 5.10: Test statistic histograms for various length payloads. Longer pay-
loads yield better signal separation and hence better authentication performance.
5.3.4 Security
We measure the security of the authentication system by observing the proba-
bility of falsely authenticating an invalid transmitter. That is, we compare the
authentication probabilities (DS 3) between the scenarios where receiver does not
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know the key (TS 2) versus when the receiver does know the key (TS 3).
For test scenario 2, the transmitter and receiver are seeded with different keys.
The transmitter then sends authenticated packets. The receiver is able to decode
the payload because of stealth (Section 5.3.1), but should not accept the packet
as authentic because the authentication is not generated using the same key.
Similarly, for test scenario 3, the transmitted and receiver are seeded with
identical keys, and the receiver should authenticate the packets.
In our tests, we did not observe any false positives in TS 2, while the au-
thentication performed as usual in TS 3 (as in the robustness tests). We were
unable to perform an exhaustive test covering all possible keys for all possible
payloads so we cannot conclusively state how secure the authentication system
is through this test. However, it does lend some evidence to the security analysis
in Chapters 2 and 3.
5.4 Conclusion
We have described experimental results obtained via software radios operating at
the 2.44GHz center frequency. With our experiment we are able to demonstrate
that our scheme is physically realizable and offers good results with low complex-
ity. We observe that the time variation of the channel inhibits the ability of the
adversary to distinguish between tagged and untagged signals, especially when
the authentication power is low. That is, the hypothesis has low power when the
false alarm probability is reasonably low. The results of the experiments detailed
above indicate that outside of simulation environments, implementations of this




6.1 Overview of Contributions
In this chapter we propose a new low-complexity solution for the generation,
exchange, and replacement of secret keys. We introduce the method in the sim-
plified case where the validity of secret keys are determined without error and
prove some helpful properties of randomly generated Markov models. We then
extend the method to include non-perfect key recovery and discuss some possible
applications.
We make the following contributions:
• We use Markov models in a novel way for key generation and replacement
(Section 6.3).
• The proposed method has no explicit signaling costs, low computation com-
plexity, and low storage requirements (Section 6.3.5).
• By using a random access strategy, the method allows the use of very large
key spaces without large storage or complexity requirements (Section 6.4.3).
• The proposed method is secure: without the correct model, knowledge of
the current key alone gives little information about past and future keys.
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Further, knowing the current key gives little information about which model
is being used. (Section 6.4.4).
• The proposed method generates keys with a positive entropy rate (Section
6.4.5).
6.2 The Key Replacement Problem
In general, secret keys cannot stay secret forever. Whether it is unintentional
(e.g., through inadvertent password disclosures) or intentional (e.g., through ad-
versarial attacks), we can never guarantee the secrecy of a key over all time.
In fact, the operation of most cryptographic systems disclose some information
about the key. When the adversary gains enough key information, she can suc-
cessfully attack the system, so it is important to replace the key before its lifetime
is exceeded.
Consider the authentication problem. When a secret key is used to generate
authentication tags, how does Bob know that the tag is genuine? He uses his
own secret key to generate a tag which he compares to the observation. If they
are identical, then he declares that the tag is genuine. Now if the tag was not
based on the secret key, then anyone could generate the tag. In this case, Eve
can generate valid tags for arbitrary messages. This is the ’impersonation attack.’
Thus the tag needs to demonstrate knowledge of the secret key.
On the other hand, if the tag demonstrates too much information about the
secret key, then Eve can eventually recover the key. If she substitutes one of
Bob’s messages with her own and it is accepted, then she successfully performed
a ’substitution attack’. Thus the Eve must have uncertainty about the key.
Maurer [1] formalized the above argument and showed that to prevent im-
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personation attacks the authentication tags must contain key information, while
to prevent substitution attacks, the authentication also must keep the key secret
from the adversary. This indicates the tradeoff between the security offered by
the key and its longevity. Since Eve gains key information each time it is used,
the key replacement problem is fundamentally important.
6.2.1 Example
Suppose Alice and Bob use secret keys to encrypt the messages that they send to
each other. Upon each observation, Eve gains some information about the secret
key. Suppose that Eve captures the key after 30 observations of repeated use.
Therefore if Alice and Bob need to securely send 100 messages, then they will
need between 4 and 100 different keys.
Obviously, it is better to replace keys more often to prevent Eve from gaining
key information. However, key replacement does come with some computational
or storage requirements, so this is generally a system tradeoff.
6.2.2 Key Replacement Paradigms
Traditional key replacement strategies fall under three paradigms:
1. Distribute secret keys over a secure channel. Generally the secure channel
has limited availability.
2. Use third parties to help manage keys. This includes the use of public key
infrastructures and key authorities.
3. Negotiate keys over an insecure channel.
We do not assume the continued availability of a secure channel or the existence
of helpful third parties. Thus we consider only the last case: the replacement of
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keys over insecure channels.
We consider symmetric keys only. It is well known [40] that symmetric keys
give the most security per bit, followed by elliptic curve keys, and finally RSA
keys give the least security per bit [41][42][43]. That is, for the same length key,
a symmetric key system is stronger than asymmetric, public-key based systems.
Further, symmetric-key cryptography requires much fewer computations than
asymmetric methods.
In the spirit of reducing complexity, we next introduce our key replacement
method.
6.3 Markov Key Replacement Method
Suppose that Alice and Bob both share identical Markov models that are in the
same state. Let each state of the model correspond to a secret key. We assume
that Alice and Bob are synchronized so that their key transitions occur at the
same time. For example, they may agree to change their keys at regular time
intervals.
We introduce our key replacement method with a simple example.
6.3.1 Overview with example
Alice and Bob agree upon the Markov model shown in Figure 6.1. The four states
represent the four possible keys. Alice and Bob are currently using key 2 and
their key replacement times are synchronized. At the next key replacement time,
Alice starts to use either key 1 or key 3 with equal probability. Suppose Alice
chooses key 1.










Figure 6.1: Simple Markov Model when K = 4 and b = 2. The states and
possible transitions are shown in (a) while a corresponding probability matrix is
shown in (b). Note that A is sparse.
keys are 1 and 3. He is able to determine which key is correct by checking the
message integrity (detailed below) for each key. After the check, Bob knows that
Alice is using key 1, and starts to use key 1.
Alice and Bob thus regain synchrony. At the next key transition, the above
steps are repeated.
6.3.2 Message model
We adopt the following message model, where we use the superscripts a, b to
denote the influence of Alice and Bob, respectively.
At time i, Alice uses her secret key kai to encrypt message s
a







and Bob decrypts the ciphertext with his key kbi




The encryption and decryption functions satisfy
s = fd(fe(s, k), k) (6.3)
We assume that the message includes an integrity check (e.g., checksum)
so that the receiver knows when the message is received correctly (sbi = s
a
i ).
For example, the message may be appended with a CRC-32 (cyclic redundancy
check) which will only match when the correct key is used to decrypt. Writing
the integrity check as ψ(·), we have
ψ(xi, k) =
 0 =⇒ sai 6= sbi or kai 6= k1 =⇒ sai = sbi and kai = k . (6.4)
That is, when the integrity check fails Bob is certain that the message is received
in error or that the keys are mismatched. For clarity of discussion, we have
assumed that a passed integrity check implies perfect message reception with the
correct key. However, in actuality there may be a non-zero probability that an
incorrect key or message can lead to a passed integrity check. We elaborate on
the effect of errors in Section 6.3.6. Therefore Bob can use the outcome of ψ(·)
to determine if he is using the correct key.
6.3.3 Markov model
Denote a Markov model by λ = (π,A), where π contains the initial key proba-
bilities and A is the transition probability matrix.
Let the size of the keyspace be K. Thus π is a K × 1 vector where π(m) is
the probability that the initial key is m. Likewise, A is a K ×K matrix where
A(m,n) is the probability that the next key will be n given that the current key
is m.
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Suppose that there exists a large codebook of Markov models Λ, where the
size of the codebook is |Λ| = L. Let Alice and Bob share a secret index 0 ≤ l < L
which they use to select the same model λa = λb = Λ(l) = (π,A).




2 , . . .. Similarly, Bob’s keys are




2, . . .. Here the subscript indicates key epochs, so that k
a
0 is
used in the epoch 0 and ka1 is used in epoch 1. We assume that the models are
synchronized so that Alice and Bob transition between keys at the same time.
They use their agreed-upon Markov models λa = λb to transition between keys;
the resulting key sequences are Markov chains.
For synchronization purposes, we assume that π deterministically selects the
initial key so that (λa = λb) =⇒ (ka0 = kb0). We further assume for complex-
ity purposes that each key can transition to exactly d other keys. We call d
the branching factor of the model, and we specify that the key transitions are
equiprobable, i.e., if a transition can occur between keys m and n it occurs with
probability 1/d.
Definition 1 The keys of Alice and Bob are synchronized for n key epochs when
kai = k
b
i , 0 ≤ i < n (6.5)
The keys lose synchrony at time n0 for
n0 = arg min
i
kai 6= kbi (6.6)
Clearly, n > 0 since the initial keys are the same. We wish to assert that n0,
the time-to-failure, is large. It is simple to show that n0 = ∞ when the integrity
check is perfect (Section 6.3.4).
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6.3.4 Key Replacement Algorithm
We detail the simple key replacement algorithms below. First we consider the
actions of the sender and then the receiver.
Key Replacement (Alice)
At the key replacement time, Alice uses λa and kai to generate the next key k
a
i+1:
1. Find the set of possible keys from kai : N = {n|A(kbi , n) > 0}.
2. Assign kai+1 = n ∈ N w.p. 1/d
After the key is chosen, Alice uses it to encrypt future messages. She does not
explicitly signal any key information to Bob.
Key Recovery (Bob)
At the key replacement time, Bob starts to receive messages encrypted with a
different key. Assume that kai = k
b
i . Since λ
b = λa, Bob knows the transition
probabilities to the next key.
1. Find the set of possible keys from kbi : N = {n|A(kbi , n) > 0}.
2. For each key n ∈ N :
• If ψ(xi, n) = 1 then assign kbi+1 = n and halt.
• Else continue.
Since we assume that kai = k
b
i and λ
b = λa, Bob considers the same keys as
Alice does during her key replacement. Since we assume that the integrity check
is perfect (equation (6.4)), Bob is guaranteed to select the correct key.
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Given that Alice and Bob share the same model, they are initially synchro-
nized with the same first key. From above, it is a simple inductive step to see that
Bob will remain in key synchrony with Alice. Thus the time-to-failure n0 = ∞,
i.e., they will never lose key synchrony.
6.3.5 Complexity and Costs
We now consider the communication, memory, and computation requirements of
this scheme.
Aside from the initial synchronization of Markov models, there is no further
explicit communications between Alice and Bob. That is, after sharing log2(L)
bits of information for initialization, the method requires no additional bits to be
transmitted over the channel.
Both the transmitter and the receiver need to have in memory the set of possi-
ble future keys. Since there are d possible keys, the minimum storage requirement
is exactly d log2(K) bits. We will show in Section 6.4.1 that this is achievable - it
is not necessary (or possible in most instances) to store the entire set of Markov
models in memory.
In terms of computation, the transmitter only needs to select a key from
the set of possible future keys. The receiver, however, needs to check the set
of keys until the correct one is found. Thus he needs to perform between 1
and d decryptions and integrity checks. Since the next key is chosen with equal
probability from the set, the receiver will perform d/2 decryptions and integrity
checks on average.
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6.3.6 Imperfect Key Recovery
In the previous section we assumed that Bob is able to determine the correct
key without error. This is usually a good approximation, but in this section we
determine the effects of detection error on the proposed key replacement method.
Suppose that the ciphertext xi has been encrypted with key ki:
x = fe(s, ki) (6.7)
When we test a single key, there are 2 cases where the key recovery fails.
1. Missed detection: the correct key is tested (k = ki) but fails the check with
probability 1− p > 0:
ψ(x, k = ki) =
 0 w.p. 1− p1 w.p. p (6.8)
(6.9)
2. False alarm: the wrong key is tested (k 6= ki) but passes the check with
probability α > 0:
ψ(x, k 6= ki) =
 0 w.p. 1− α1 w.p. α (6.10)
Recall that the recovery performed by Bob (Section 6.3.4) checks the validity
of d keys. We assume that the trials have independent outcomes. Considering a
set of d keys, there are four possible outcomes.
1. The correct key passes the integrity check (all others fail). This occurs with
probability
Pr[Case 1] = p(1− α)d−1 (6.11)
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2. The wrong key passes the integrity check (all others fail). This occurs with
probability
Pr[Case 2] = (d− 1)(1− p)α(1− α)d−2 (6.12)
3. No keys pass the integrity check. This occurs with probability
Pr[Case 3] = (1− p)(1− α)d−1 (6.13)
4. Multiple keys pass the integrity check. This occurs with probability
Pr[Case 4] = 1− Pr[Case 1, 2, or 3] (6.14)
Looking ahead to Section 6.3.6, the probability of a correct detection Pr[Case 1]
needs to be sufficiently high, otherwise Alice and Bob will lose synchrony quickly.
In the following section we modify the recovery algorithm to improve the detec-
tion probability in the midst of errors.
Extended Recovery Algorithm
In general, a key is used for multiple messages. Rather than determining the
replacement key after a single message, consider the utility of using C messages.
For the key epoch i, we denote the messages using the same key as x1i , x
2
i , . . ..
The number of times the check passes is independent for each key. Bob tallies
the number of times a key passes the check over the C messages, and selects the
key that has the most positives.
Again assume that kai = k
b
i and λ
b = λa so that Bob knows the transition
probabilities to the next key.
1. Find the set of possible keys from kbi : N = {n|A(kbi , n) > 0}.
152




ψ(xci , n) (6.15)
3. Select kbi+1 = arg maxn T [n]
The probability that the correct key will be detected c times out of C is
given by the binomial probability B(c, C, p). Similarly, for the incorrect keys
the probability is B(c, C, α). Therefore since the the trials have independent
outcomes, the probability that the Bob chooses the correct key is the probability
that the correct key is detected more times than any other key.













Aside from the detection and false alarm probabilities (p, α, respectively), the
number of messages C determines the detection probability p̃ of the correct key.
Figure 6.2 shows that the probability of choosing the wrong key falls exponentially
as C increases. Further, the test does not need to consider large C when the
detection probability p is high.
Synchronization Performance
The probability that Bob chooses the incorrect key is ε = 1 − p̃. Thus the
probability that Alice and Bob lose synchrony at epoch n0 is
Pr(Lost at n0) = ε(1− ε)n0−1 (6.18)
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Figure 6.2: Probability of choosing the incorrect key for various raw detection
key probabilities p when α = 10−7. Extending the key replacement over multiple
messages encrypted with the same key improves the detection probability. Lower
p require more observations for good detection probability.
We are interested in the case when Alice and Bob maintain synchrony for at least
n0 with a certain probability. That is,
Pr(n0 > n) =
∑
n<n0
Pr(Lost at n0) (6.19)
= 1− (1− ε)n−1 (6.20)
n =
log(1− Pr(n0 > n))
log(1− ε)
(6.21)
For example, we calculate that when ε = 10−4, then with probability 99.99%
Alice and Bob remain synchronized for at least 9.2 ∗ 104 keys. Figure 6.3 shows
the number of key transitions before failure for various confidence levels.
Complexity and Costs
When the recovery of the key is extended for C messages, the number of compu-
tations and memory requirements necessarily increase.
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Figure 6.3: Number of key transitions before failure for various confidences.
Since the computations are identical for each message, the computations in-
crease by a factor of C. The final step of selecting the key with the largest score
requires negligible computation.
As for the storage requirements, the set of possible keys remains constant over
the duration of the test, so there is no additional cost. However, there is the need
to keep the tally of how many times each key passes the integrity checks. This
requires log2(C) bits per key, or d log2(C) bits in total. Note that there was no




For synchronization purposes, the choice of model λ determines the initial key
k0. That is, π is non-zero for exactly one entry.
To limit the complexity of the receiver (Section 6.3.4), we focus on the case
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Figure 6.4: A fully specified Markov Model with 32-bit keys, K = 232, branching
factor d = 2. Requires at least 1 gigabyte to store.
where the branching factor of the model is fixed to be exactly d for all keys. That








I(A(m,n)) = d (6.23)
where I(·) is the indicator function.
6.4.2 Construction
How should the Markov models be specified? The Markov model may be fully
specified and stored in memory. The storage requirements for a single model are
O(dK). This quickly becomes infeasible when L or K grow large. For example, a
single Markov model for (unrealistically small) 32 bit keys would require at least
512 megabytes (232 bits = 512 megabytes).
The need for multiple models increases the storage requirements to O(dKL).
With L = K = 232 and a modest branching factor of d = 2, the storage require-
ment is approximately 232+32+1, or 4.3 billion gigabytes (1 gigabyte = 233 bits).
Clearly, with even modest key sizes the storage requirements can be prohibitive.
We therefore turn our attention towards a randomly accessible Markov model.
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0101011011100101010101....} }
Key 1 Key 2
...PRNGseed
Figure 6.5: Construction of a random access Markov Model.
That is, we do not store the entire Markov model in memory, but we are able to
directly query the transition probabilities for a given key.
We assume m-bit keys. How do we find the state transitions from key i? We
outline one possibility below.
1. Seed the pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) with a value f(l, i),
where l is the key that chooses the model λ and i is the current key. For
example, f(·) may be f(l, i) = K ∗ l + i
2. Until there are d unique keys, select m-bit chunks of the PRNG output.
Each chunk corresponds to a candidate next key.
3. The transition probabilities of each candidate key are 1/d.
This process is diagrammed in Figure 6.5. Upon completion of these steps,
the transition probabilities for the current state are specified.
Since π chooses a single initial key, it is easy to specify. One possibility is to
always choose the first key reachable from key 0.
6.4.3 Model Properties
Consider an arbitrary model λ = λa = λb constructed as in Section 6.4.2 and a
corresponding sample key sequence ka0 , k
a
1 , . . .. What are the desirable properties
for such a sequence?
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a) b)
Figure 6.6: a) Small reachable subspace b) Periodic
First, the keys should be drawn from a large space. If the space were small, the
adversary could successfully attack with non-negligible probability. As a simple
example, with a space of only 4 keys, an adversary correctly guesses the key with
probability 1/4. Thus K should be large.
Closely related is the reachable subspace of K given any initial key k0. A key
v is reachable from u if there exists a path from u to v: u  v. If it can reach
many keys, then it is difficult for the adversary to recover the key information.
As a simple example, consider the graph in Figure 6.6a. Given any key, the
reachable space is small relative to the size of the entire keyspace. This is clearly
suboptimal.
Finally, the graph should not be periodic. In Figure 6.6b the entire space
is reachable given any initial key, but the regular nature of the key transitions
makes it easier for the adversary to guess the next key. Note that in Figure 6.6a
the situation is even more dire because the periods are small.
Therefore we have three desirable properties for the models:
1. K is large
2. The reachable subspace of K is large for almost all keys
3. The resulting key sequences are aperiodic
We show that satisfaction of the above properties depends on the keyspace K
158
and the branching factor d.
K is large
The size of the keyspace K plays an important role in securing the secret key.
When K is small, it is possible for the adversary to test all possible keys and
recover the correct key (e.g., by using equation (6.4)). This is known as the
brute-force method since no intelligence is needed, only raw computation ability.
Therefore K should be large so that the adversary cannot use brute-force
methods to overcome the system. However, the birthday paradox states that
O(
√
K) computations are usually sufficient to find a collision between two ci-
phertexts given distinct inputs. Therefore the condition is that
√
K is sufficiently
large so that it is infeasible for the adversary to perform a brute-force attack.
Reachable Keyspace
We show that given any initial key, the reachable keyspace is large, that is, O(K).
First we introduce the concept of strongly connected components. We show that
the existence and size of a single giant connected component (GCC) depends on
the branching factor d. Finally, we show that with probability 1, a) all keys can
reach the GCC and b) no keys leave the GCC.
Strongly Connected Components
As specified in Section 6.4.1, the Markov models are random directed graphs
(digraphs) with constant out-degree. A digraph S is a strongly connected when
there exists a path between any randomly chosen pair of vertices u, v ∈ S:
u v (6.24)
v  u (6.25)
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The strongly connect components (SCCs) of a digraph are the maximal strongly
connected subgraphs. The interpretation in our case is the following. If the
current key is in an SCC, any other key in the same SCC may be chosen in the
future with non-zero probability.
Size of the GCC
When the size of a SCC reaches O(K), it is typically referred to as the giant
connected component (GCC) since it dominates the other SCCs in size. For
a given digraph, the SCCs may be identified using efficient algorithms such as
Tarjan’s algorithm [44] or Gabow’s algorithm [45].
When the graphs are constructed randomly as in Section 6.4.2, we give the
size of the GCC in probability. We outline the procedure and then give the
results.
First we define the concept of fan-out and fan-in. The fan-in of a node v is
the set of vertices u for which there exists a path u v. Similarly, the fan-out of
a node u is the set of nodes v for which there exists a path u  v. The fan-out
(or fan-in) of a vertex is large when its size is O(K). Let L+ be the set of vertices
with a large fan-out, and let L− be the set of vertices with a large fan-in.
Intuitively, when a node u has a large fan-out and a distinct node v 6= u
has a large fan-in, there exists a path u  v with high probability. Thus when
nodes have both large fan-in and large fan-out, they are connected with high
probability. The above statements are made precise in [46]. We highlight the
relevant results below.
Let π− (resp., π+) be the probability that a randomly chosen vertex has a
large fan-in (resp., large fan-out). It follows that |L−| = π−K and |L+| = π+K.
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p+i (1− π+)i (6.27)
where p−i (resp., π









 1 i = d0 otherwise (6.29)
Note that each vertex has constant out-degree d but variable in-degree. In our
scenario, the probability that there exists a transition between a randomly chosen
pair of source and destination keys is p = d/K, and so the in-degree distribution
is given by the binomial probability mass function with parameter p.
When d > 1, π− has a unique solution in (0, 1), and π+ = 1. In other words, a
positive fraction of vertices have large fan-in while all vertices have large fan-out.
Based on the argument above, the size of the GCC is approximately
|G| u |L− ∩ L+| (6.30)
u |L−|+ |L+| − |L− ∪ L+| (6.31)
u
(







pij(1− π−)i(1− π+)j (6.33)
= 0 (6.34)
since π+ = 1. Thus, the GCC G is unique with size
|G| u π−K (6.35)
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with probability approaching 1 as K ↑ ∞.
Table 6.1 shows the size of the GCC in theory and in practice for various
branching factors. For each value of d, 100 matrices of size K = 210 were gener-
ated. The size of the GCC was found using Tarjan’s algorithm and averaged over
each realization. Shown in the table is the ratio of GCC size to K. The theoret-
ical GCC size matches very well with the empirical evidence. Clearly, increasing
d increases the proportion of the GCC, though the gains diminish after d = 4.
When the size of the GCC is less than K, the size of the reachable subspace
is diminished. In bits, we say that the penalty is
Penalty = − log 2(|G|/K) (6.36)
For example, if the GCC has size 29 but the keyspace has size 210, then the
penalty is 1 bit. Thus the keys that are traversed offer the security of a 9-bit key
instead of a 10-bit key.
Note the significant decrease in penalty as the branching factor is increased
from 2 to 4. We observe diminishing improvements for larger branching factors.
Reachability of GCC
Since the GCC G is large, any key k ∈ G has a reachable subspace with size
O(K) by definition. However, what about those keys that are not in G? We need
to show that with high probability, a) the initial key will enter G, and b) given
that a selected key is in the GCC, future keys will remain in the GCC.
First observe that when a key leaves the GCC, it cannot come back (it has
no path). Suppose that the key is v /∈ K. If there existed a path from v  K,
then since K v this implies that v ∈ K, which is a contradiction.
Consider the keys that are connected to G. Let G− be the set of keys that
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Table 6.1: Size of the GCC
Branching GCC Proportion Penalty
factor Theory Empirical (bits)
2 .7972 .7972 .3369
3 .9408 .9404 .0881
4 .9803 .9801 .0287
5 .9931 .9932 .0100
6 .9975 .9977 .0036
7 .9991 .9990 .0013
8 .9997 .9997 .0005
have a path to G and let G+ be the set of keys that are reachable from G.
G− = {u|u G} (6.37)
G+ = {v|G  v} (6.38)
The resulting set B = G− ∪ G ∪ G+ forms a subgraph that is termed a bowtie
digraph as shown in Figure 6.7. The wings of the bowtie are formed by two
wings: G+ with vertex set L+ ∩ L− and G− with vertex set L+ ∩ L−. Thus
B = L+ ∪ L−.
Recall that |L+| = K and hence L+ = K. Hence B = K, i.e., the bowtie
graph encompasses all vertices in the space. By the same fact, we also have that
L+ = ∅ and therefore G− = ∅. Therefore, any randomly chosen key is either in
G+ or G.
The structure of B yields the following properties:





Figure 6.7: An example bowtie digraph connected to the giant connected com-
ponent G. G+ leads into G, G− emanates from G.
current state will eventually be in G. With probability approaching 1 as
K ↑ ∞, any randomly chosen key will enter the GCC.
2. Once a key is in the GCC, it will not depart since with probability ap-
proaching 1 as K ↑ ∞, |G−| = 0.
Aperiodicity of GCC
A strongly connected graph is periodic if the GCD of all cycle lengths is strictly
> 1. Random digraphs with constant branching factor are aperiodic with high
probability. We can loosely bound the probability of having a periodic GCC by
reasoning as follows:
1. Suppose that it is possible to remove transitions from the GCC until it is a
minimally connected periodic graph. That is, removing one more transition
will make the graph neither connected nor periodic. Suppose that the
resulting subgraph has period x > 1.
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2. Since the subgraph is periodic, we can color the nodes so that only like-
colored nodes are reachable in length nx transitions, where n is any positive
integer. By periodicity, any path through the subgraph has the same se-
quence of colors, modulo rotations. For example, if x = 2 then the color
sequence is always black-white-black-white etc.
3. In order for the GCC to be periodic, all the transitions must follow the
color sequence of the periodic subgraph. Since the transitions are randomly





which is vanishing small for large K and x > 1. Therefore, with high
probability, the GCC is aperiodic.
4. Since in step 1 we assumed the a periodic subgraph existed, we have found
an upper bound.
Therefore with reasonably large K, the probability that a randomly generated
digraph with constant out-degree is aperiodic is very high.
6.4.4 Codebook Properties
We show that the following properties about the codebook Λ hold:
1. H(ki+1|ki) u H(K) (Entropy of next key)
2. H(l|ki) u H(Λ) (Entropy of model in use)
where K is the keyspace and Λ is the set of Markov models. That is, given the
current key, little information is revealed about the next key or which Markov
model is currently being used.
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Entropy of Next Key
Given a model and the current key, there are d candidates for the next key. Over
all L models, there are therefore dL candidates uniformly distributed over the K











The entropy is therefore










where h(x) = −x log2(x) (6.43)
Since the keys are chosen uniformly over each A, P (|A(m,n)| = x) is approx-
imated by the Poisson distribution





where x̄ is the expected number of occurrences. In our case, x̄ = dL/K.
The entropy of the next key can thus be approximated
H(ki+1|ki = m) =
∑
x













Figure 6.8 shows that the entropy is close to the maximum when the branching
probability is high and the number of models L is high. The critical point is that
dL must be greater than K; this ensures that over all the models the possible keys
are sufficiently random. Note that with sufficiently many models, the branching





















Figure 6.8: Entropy of next key. K = 264.
Entropy of Model in Use
The current state should give information about which model λ is being used.
From Section 6.4.3 we know that the GCC G has size O(K) and that the num-
ber of non-zero stationary probabilities µi are also O(K). For large d, we can
approximate |G| u K.
Assume that the Markov chain is in steady state. Let the stationary proba-













We note from experiment that the stationary probabilities are well approxi-
mated by a Rayleigh distribution when d is small and a normal distribution when
d is large (Figures 6.9 and 6.10 respectively). Thus when there are L independent
instances of µli they will follow this distribution.
Figure 6.11 shows that the model entropy is close to the maximum when the
branching probability is high and the number of models L is high. Increasing the
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Distribution of Stationary Probabilities (d = 4)
Observed
Rayleigh PDF
Figure 6.9: Distribution of stationary probabilities are well approximated with
Rayleigh distribution for small d.













Distribution of Stationary Probabilities (d = 32)
Observed
Gaussian PDF
Figure 6.10: Distribution of stationary probabilities are well approximated with
Gaussian distribution for large d.
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Figure 6.11: Entropy of Model given current key. K = 210.
branching factor improves the model entropy.
6.4.5 Entropy Rate
Since the GCC is strongly connected, it is irreducible. From Section 6.4.3 it is
also aperiodic. An irreducible and aperiodic Markov chain converges to its unique
stationary distribution µ, and the resulting entropy rate is
H(X ) = −
∑
m,n∈G
µmAmn logAmn ≤ log d (6.49)
with equality when a transition between keys m and n implies that Amn = 1/d.
Thus entropy rate is maximized when future keys are equiprobable.
Note that the calculated entropy rate is for a given Markov model. Given
that it is known, the entropy rate is given by equation (6.49). When the model is
not known, the entropy of the next key was shown to be high, near the entropy
of the keyspace K (Section 6.4.4).
Having a higher entropy rate is beneficial for security since a model will be-
come associated with many paths rather than only a few. (Consider the multi-
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plicity of paths that arise when d is increased from 1.) This in turn makes it more
difficult for the adversary to determine which model is being used. She may try
to use the Baum-Welch algorithm[47] but it is not accurate unless the number of
observations is very high with respect to size of the state space. Of course, with
large keys will not be the case.
6.5 Applications
We give a few examples of how this key replacement method may be used. This
list is by no means comprehensive and is meant to give a taste of the possibilities.
6.5.1 Cryptography
The proposed method may be used to replace keys in cryptographic frameworks.
In cryptography, all data assumed to be received without error. That is, the
physical layer is abstracted away to provide an error-free channel.
In this case, the correct key always passes the integrity check, so p = 1. The
probability that an incorrect key passes the check is given by the collision prob-
ability α. For example, when the integrity check is a 32-bit tag, the probability
that two randomly chosen unique keys have the same tag are 2−32 u 2 × 10−10.
Thus a single message is sufficient to determine the next key with high probability,
and the number of transitions to failure is very high (Section 6.3.6).
6.5.2 Physical Layer Authentication
The proposed method may be used to replace the secret keys in the physical
layer authentication framework (Chapters 2 and 3). Here, the secret key does
not effect the recovery of the messages from Alice, but effects the ability of Bob
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to authenticate Alice.
In this case, the detection probability p is never unity due to the random
channel and noise. However, the false alarm probability can be set arbitrarily
low as a design parameter. As shown previously, channels with low SNR do not
offer very high detection probability, and thus the modified recovery algorithm
of Section 6.3.6 must be used in order to keep Alice and Bob in synchrony.
However, there is an interesting tradeoff between p and the authentication
probability. When the next key is not immediately recovered, Bob must delay
his decision of Alice’s authenticity because it is dependent on having the correct
key. For those messages, the decision of authenticity are made retroactively and
are delayed for up to C message periods.
6.5.3 Frequency Hopping Communications
Rather than restricting ourselves to keys, we consider the application of this
method to another situation where a variable changes pseudo-randomly. In
frequency-hopped systems, data is transmitted over different carriers that change
at deterministic intervals. Rather than having the data carriers change determin-
istically as well, the proposed method may be used to select the carrier (or set of
carriers). Of particular interest are multi-carrier authentication systems where
the placement of the authentication tag may be chosen according to this method.
Suppose for simplicity that the system uses one carrier at a time. The de-
tection and false alarm probabilities are determined by the effective SNR of the
channel. When the carrier changes, the receiver can use an energy detector to
scan the set of d possible next carriers and decide which contains a signal and
which contains noise only.
The analogue of using multiple messages in the previous situations is to extend
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the energy detection over time to provide a better estimate of which carrier is
being used. Also, the increased complexity lies in the necessity of monitoring d
carriers simultaneously. However, this may be less of an issue in software-based
radio where much of the computation is done in software and not hardware.
6.6 Related Work
Without assuming the use of secure channels or third parties, Alice and Bob must
negotiate keys over the insecure channel. Public key (asymmetric) cryptography
(e.g., Diffie-Hellman algorithm [48]) is often used for this purpose. However, it
is computationally intensive since it relies on operations such as modular expo-
nentiation. In comparison, symmetric key cryptography is fast and efficient but
does not lend itself to key negotiation.
For this reason, many systems use public key cryptography to exchange sym-
metric keys which are used to encrypt the bulk of the communications. When it
is time to replace the key, Alice and Bob can restart the key negotiation to create
a fresh key.
There has been work towards reducing the cost of key exchange after the
initial setup. One of the simplest schemes is for Alice use the current key ki to
encrypt the future key ki+1 and sent it to Bob. This has the benefit of avoiding the
additional cost of key negotiation. However, in the event that Eve does acquire
a key, all subsequent keys are made accessible to her.
The idea of hash chains [49] defends against this scenario. Suppose that Alice
and Bob agree upon a key k0 and an index n. Then given H(·), they calculate the
keys kj = H
j(k0) where H
j(·) is a one-way function applied j times to the input.
and V be an arbitrary input. A one-way function H(·) satisfies the following:
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1. Given x, it is easy to compute H(x).
2. Given y, it is hard to compute x such that H(x) = y.
The first key that is used is kn. When it expires, it is replaced with kn−1. Likewise,
kj is replaced by kj−1 until k0 expires. At this point, there Alice and Bob run out
of keys and a new k0 needs to be agreed upon. Thus n should be sufficiently large
for the time scale of communications between Alice and Bob. The security of this
scheme lies in the one-way property of H(·) so that knowledge of the current key
does not reveal future keys. However, prior keys are easily derived by the same
property.
6.7 Conclusion
We have demonstrated and proved properties of key exchange based on random
Markov models. The method is shown to generate highly random keys while re-
maining lightweight in terms of communication, storage, and computation costs.
We also note that the usefulness of the method is not restricted to keys,
but to any variable which is periodically changed in a synchronous manner. For
example, we have discussed the application to frequency-hopped communications
systems. Of particular interest for this thesis is application to the multi-carrier




We envision three main directions in which to take the current research.
First, with the upcoming adoption and availability of LTE and WiMax net-
works, it will be interesting to study how the physical layer authentication meth-
ods presented in chapters 3 and 4 may be incorporated. Specifically, there are
questions of how the method work with existing authentication methods at the
higher layers such as EAP (extensible authentication protocol): how do the higher
layers interpret the authentication decisions generated at the physical layer?
Second, we can study how our method may be used together with other phys-
ical layer authentication methods. For example, the SEVILLE project [50] uses
the fact that the wireless channel decorrelates rapidly with location to distinguish
between authentic and inauthentic nodes. This is in contrast with the method
presented in this thesis, where the transmission signals are perturbed to signal
authentication information. The combination of the two methods may prove to
be even more useful and powerful.
Third, rather than intentionally perturbing the signal, we may study how
unperturbed signals may already have unique characteristics that may permit
identification. That is, the authentication information may be unintentional and
may arise from unique device characteristics. To analyze this, it may be possible
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to parametrize such unintentional perturbations in order to create a suitable
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